本帖最后由 冰蚁 于 2016-10-17 10:39 编辑
Dracula 发表于 2016-10-17 09:41
Alt-Right不是共和党。以前只是其一个边缘，就是现在也绝不是其大多数。
按你的不是大多数的理论，trump 连总统候选人都当不上不是。
如果我上面对中间选民投票率的估计正确，那trump当选总统的概率大过希拉里。
冰蚁 发表于 2016-10-17 23:35
中间选民推向民主党倒不至于。希拉里太烂了。我觉得今年最大可能是投票率极低。大量的中间选民厌恶两个候 ...
为什么你认为现在的民调是垃圾数据呢？
两个星期以前看到的
Donald J. Trump’s Television Future
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/donald-j-trumps-television-future/504500/
https://cdn.theatlantic.com/assets/media/img/mt/2016/10/RTSPKH9/lead_960.jpg?1476801588
Every political campaign is a media organization. There are stars (e.g., candidates and their surrogates), shows (e.g., rallies and talking points), and distribution strategies (e.g., television bookings and get-out-the-vote efforts). But there has never been anything quite like the Donald J. Trump Show, which at times seems more like a media organization posing as a political campaign than a political campaign with an organized media strategy.
So, with Trump facing a potential wipeout on November 8, there is a growing sense that he’ll start a news network in 2017. Trump has already surrounded himself with advisers who are more TV than GOTV. The campaign's chief executive is Steve Bannon, the former head of the alt-right website Breitbart. Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner is the owner of the New York Observer. Roger Ailes, the disgraced founder and CEO of the Fox News Channel, is an adviser.
On Monday, the Financial Times reported that Kushner approached a boutique investment firm that specializes in media deals to inquire about the possibility of building a post-election television network run by Trump himself. Where is this all headed? Here are four possibilities.
1. Trump TV—on Cable
The holy grail for a defeated Donald Trump might be to exact revenge on the establishment Republican Party by building a nativist rival to the Fox News Channel on cable. Let’s call it Trump Cable News.
The Trump Cable News lineup might include a primetime show with Trump himself. Another hour might include Sean Hannity, the Fox News anchor and Trump supporter whom many suspect will leave his network at the end of the year. Even Bill O’Reilly might be drawn to abandon Fox for a new venture that paid him more money. But that raises one huge problem for Trump’s cable pipe dream—money. Where is he going to get it?
Trump would need upfront support from investors and ongoing support from many advertisers, because building a cable network from scratch is prohibitively expensive, even for a self-proclaimed billionaire. "It seems highly unlikely that Trump—who is loath even to spend money on polls because he believes there are plenty of public ones he can have for free—would suddenly cough up tens and perhaps hundreds of millions of dollars to enter the fraught business of cable TV,” wrote Ryan Lizza, a staff writer at The New Yorker.
Several people told The Street that the costs of setting up a Fox News rival could easily run between $300 million and $800 million. Investors and television experts are practically united in their certainty that Trump has so utterly demolished his brand that few investors or advertisers would want to support his endeavor. Mike Allen reported that a source close to the investment firm that spoke with Kushner had "no interest in being in business with Trump.”
What’s more, the pay TV industry is both bloated and in structural decline. There are too many cable channels who want a spot in the bundle and not enough new audiences who are willing to pay. Even Roger Ailes' recent foray into cable news, Fox Business, has struggled to attract audiences despite hundreds of millions of dollars in investment.
2. Trump TV—Online
If the year were 1996, Trump’s inability to secure investment for a cable news network would mean the end of his television dreams. But today there are tens of millions of U.S. households subscribing to Netflix, Amazon Video, and other “over the top” (OTT) online video options that go around the cable bundle. Trump could build a digital television network.
The prototype for Trump might be The Blaze, Glenn Beck’s multimedia operation, which includes a website, radio programs, and a paid subscription digital television network. Since launching in 2010, The Blaze has seen highs and lows that suggest the road to success in digital TV is easier described than executed. In its first year, Beck’s enterprise took in more than $40 million in revenue, with about 300,000 subscribers paying at least $100 a year. But since peaking in late 2014, viewership and audiences have declined significantly, necessitating layoffs that essentially shrunk the company by half, according to reporting by The Daily Beast.
But Trump’s fame and the fanatical devotion of his fanbase are both an order of magnitude greater than Beck’s, suggesting his celebrity could translate into millions of paid television subscribers. Even one million Trump TV subscribers paying $150 a year (or about $12 a month) for a television, radio, and website product would mean $150 million in the first year. That would probably be enough to lure Hannity at a discount and other conservative fixtures like Laura Ingraham to Trump’s stable. For premium subscriptions—say, $200 or $300 a year—Trump could promise free tickets to Trump national tours, discounts to Trump merchandise and hotels, and even dubious products like online real-estate lessons. After all, Trump was desperate to merchandise his likeness and surname before the election, and with a built-in audience of about 60 million voters and hundreds of thousands of national rally attendees, he is once again poised to capitalize on his name.
3. The Trump Show
The problem with television is that it’s expensive to set up a network and the cash flow is unpredictable, because it’s not obvious how many Trump supporters will want to give a presidential loser $100 a year in perpetuity. If Trump gets blown out in November, his brand will be tarnished both nationally and within a bitter Republican Party (and an angry conservative media) that holds him responsible.
The least risky strategy for Trump would be to sign a contract for his own show on an existing network. It is hard to imagine a broadcast channel or cable news news network giving Trump an hour, since their advertisers might flee. That leaves channels like RT, the Russian-owned television network, or a YouTube show that airs on Breitbart.
The Trump Show itself could be multimedia programming. Trump's bluster is tailor-made for talk radio, and he doesn’t seem to have much trouble filling hours of time with accounts of his victories, resentments, and grand theories. Lynne Costantini, a media adviser and veteran of The Blaze, told The Street she could imagine Vice as a template. "You could produce a show or two and sell those shows to other, well distributed networks and then make your bones that way," she said. "Vice has done that very well."
4. The Trump Purgatory
Ultimately, Trump may be frozen out of each of these possibilities. Building a successful television network requires a lot of upfront investment and cooperation from conservative media stars, which might be difficult in a period of bitter recriminations following a tough loss. Trump’s pride might prevent him from doing something small-bore, like a radio show or streaming television program. But without a suitable distribution partner, Trump might be left with something like a permanent pseudo-campaign. It’s not impossible to imagine him continuing to tour the country giving speeches, while asking for his supporters to pay higher prices for the tickets.
But if there is a theme to Trump’s portfolio of eponymous projects, from his steaks and neckties to his university, it is that he has no problem licensing his name to products without bothering to ensure their quality. If Trump loses the election but appears to keep his audience, he may be tantalized to pursue a lazier option—for example, to license his face and surname to a Breitbart feature that also sells his merchandise. After all, for a real-estate mogul and defeated presidential candidate to reinvent himself as a network mastermind would require Trump to pull off one of the most successful post-defeat reinventions since, well, this guy. And if there’s one thing America has learned about Trump in the last six months, it’s that he’s not gifted at pivoting.
今天离大选只有6天了。过去两个星期，希拉里坏消息连连。Wikileaks泄露的一些内幕，Obamacare价格的大幅度增长，和FBI语焉不详的重新展开对希拉里电子邮件的调查。尤其是Trump过去1个星期自制力出奇的好，没发什么出格的言论，媒体的焦点都集中在希拉里身上。大选的形势开始拉紧。但是从FBI声明泄露后的民调来看，希拉里仍然是有相当的优势，Trump想要赢还是会很难。
目前摇摆州的形势，Iowa和Ohio是Trump领先，这两个州属于中西部的rust belt，白人人口的比例又比较高，Trump的贸易保护和White Nationalism对他们有很大的吸引力，early voting目前的结果也是对希拉里不利。我估计Trump会赢下它们。Wisconsin, Michigan, Colorado, Virginia, New Hampshire和Pennsylvania是希拉里的fire wall。只要能赢下它们就可以保证270票多数选举人票。这些州从今年5月份开始就是希拉里一直领先，就是现在她的优势也还是挺大。这里Virginia希拉里几乎肯定可以拿下，Colorado, Pennsylvania和New Hampshire问题也不大。Wisconsin和Michigan则是属于中西部，和Iowa, Ohio有不少相似之处。但是Wisconsin向来有progressive的传统，这次大选共和党的初选Trump在那儿输的又很惨，Michigan则是少数民族比例比较高。Trump在最后冲刺的几天把注意力集中在那儿，这也是他这次大选获胜最可能的途径。但至少就是目前来看，他能赢下这两个州的可能性还是不大。因此现在形势还是希拉里领先。
其它的摇摆州，North Carolina和Florida现在非常接近，就early voting的结果来看，黑人的投票率比2008和2012年有不小的下降，这对希拉里是个坏消息，不过拉丁裔的投票率在Trump言论的刺激下上升很多，是否能弥补黑人方面的损失还不是很清楚。Florida有29票，对Trump来说是必须要赢下的州。因为民主党方面在ground game上的领先，我觉得这两个州希拉里赢的可能性还是稍大一些。Nevada拉丁裔的人口比例较高，early voting的结果也是显示民主党有优势，我估计希拉里能赢下那儿。Arizona随着拉丁裔人口比例的增高今年也变为摇摆州，希拉里在那儿投资也很多，本来我觉得希拉里赢得可能性很大，但是最近那儿的民调也转为稍稍偏Trump，我也觉得Trump可能更占上风一些。其它的如Georgia, Texas, Utah, Alaska等，2个星期以前希拉里在那儿都还是有一些希望，但现在来看已经不太可能了。尤其是Texas一直是民主党梦想得到的地方，现在看来得等到2024或者是2028年了。
最后，FBI对希拉里电子邮件的调查，是星期天刚拿到的warrant，就是里面真有什么对希拉里很不利的东西，FBI找到，反复核实确定再公布出来，1个星期多一点的时间应该是不够用的。因此Trump的支持者指望着那儿有什么特别的突破我觉得不现实。更现实的可能性是今年的民调有系统性的误差低估Trump的支持率。这个可能就我读到的一些讨论的来看，道理不是很充分。不过就early voting的结果来看，这个可能性还不能完全给否定掉。
（下个星期一，我可能就大选的形势最后更新一下。）
今天是棒球世界大赛第7场。历史上有个规律，如果是American League赢，共和党候选人更可能当选，如果是National League赢，民主党更可能获胜。我数了一下。从1920年到2012年，24次大选，这个规律准了17回，准确率71%。尤其是过去4次大选，2000年和2004年是Yankees和Red Sox，2008年和2012年是Phillies和Giants获胜，这个规律最近表现不错。因此即使不是棒球球迷，对今天晚上这场球也应该特别关注。喜欢Trump的应该支持Indians，喜欢希拉里的应该支持Cubs。希拉里本人是在芝加哥出生，在Illinois长大，这次她也支持Cubs。不过她和Bill一样，在这方面很是机会主义的作风，出于政治考虑，以前也表示支持过别的摇摆州的球队。
Dracula 发表于 2016-11-2 16:17
今天离大选只有6天了。过去两个星期，希拉里坏消息连连。Wikileaks泄露的一些内幕，Obamacare价格的大幅度 ...
RCP的地图，今天是273 vs 265 希拉里稍领先，不过
这是无toss up的结果……
不然则是 226--132--180
Toss up有132之多……
关于华人川粉，
http://kuow.org/post/why-some-chinese-americans-support-trump-it-has-nothing-do-china
海天 发表于 2016-11-3 07:28
RCP的地图，今天是273 vs 265 希拉里稍领先，不过
这是无toss up的结果……
Trump即使把所有的toss-up states都赢下来还是会输，因此他现在形势还是很不利，最近他把注意力集中在Wisconsin和Michigan，从这两个州的人口组成和经济结构上来看有一些机会，但是不大。
你提到的那篇文章支持Trump的最主要的理由是affirmative action，我在网站上以及接触到的华人中支持Trump的很多也是提这个理由。我觉得我对时事新闻读的挺多挺仔细，但我就从来没有看到任何报道提到Trump正式的政策或者在rally上的言论攻击过affirmative action，他们在这个问题上我觉得是一厢情愿。Trump的铁杆支持者主要是教育程度低的白人，上哈佛大学有没有按种族的配额他们并不怎么关心。共和党一向主张私人企业和私人组织的决定，联邦政府应该尽量不干预。因此私立大学或私人企业自主决定在招生或招人时对黑人或拉丁裔倾斜，他们也不太可能干预。而且Trump这个人管理大型组织的能力并不怎么样，更不能期待他在这个问题上会对联邦监管机构施加特别的影响。尤其是Trump代表的是一种White Nationalism的情绪，他们得势对华人并没有好处。
至于文章里提到的支持Trump的华人赞成他在移民上的政策。且不说Trump那些政策根本不现实，那些华人好像都是在高技术领域工作，墨西哥的非法移民对他们根本没有竞争，反而是会降低他们享受的物品或服务的价格，对他们的生活水平其实是有提高的。他们在这个问题上和Trump有共鸣，我觉得主要还是出于文化上或者说是种族上的因素。
本帖最后由 mezhan 于 2016-11-3 12:48 编辑
Dracula 发表于 2016-11-3 05:41
今天是棒球世界大赛第7场。历史上有个规律，如果是American League赢，共和党候选人更可能当选，如果是Nati ...
四局 下半 芝加哥 3:1 领先.
让 108岁 的老人们 瞑目要紧.
五局 上半 芝加哥 5:1 领先.
八局 下半 6:6
加时
十局 上半 芝加哥 8:6 领先.
芝加哥 8:7 赢
Dracula 发表于 2016-11-2 19:23
Trump即使把所有的toss-up states都赢下来还是会输，因此他现在形势还是很不利，最近他把注意力集中在Wis ...
哦，realclearpolitics的图近几天变化很大，把宾西法尼亚弗吉尼亚新罕布仕尔科罗拉多等州都划到了
Toss up(估计是因为希拉里领先幅度落到了某阈值以下)，所以总数从272急降到226。
看到Nate silver同学发话了，
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/election-update-yes-donald-trump-has-a-path-to-victory/
Dracula 发表于 2016-11-3 05:41
今天是棒球世界大赛第7场。历史上有个规律，如果是American League赢，共和党候选人更可能当选，如果是Nati ...
标普500的预测可能关联性更大吧，目前84%川普会赢。538上川普赢面上升到33%了，nate终于写了一篇文章“对，川普也有通向胜利的地图”。记得共和党primary的时候，自他老兄开始写了这样一篇类似的文章之后川普就开始了螺旋上升之路。这届选举主流媒体的一边倒，和现实生活中大众的沉默是我在这里生活20年来少见的。还有6天，民意就要揭晓了。
Dracula 发表于 2016-11-3 05:17
今天离大选只有6天了。过去两个星期，希拉里坏消息连连。Wikileaks泄露的一些内幕，Obamacare价格的大幅度 ...
打不开?再试这个 http://www.cqtimes.cn/newsdetail/index/id/137007.html
我的看法和他差不多，不过我觉得他在种族问题上的话说的比较客气，我从网上论坛中得来的印象，从大陆出来的华人好多其实就是种族主义者，不仅是对黑人或拉丁裔这些所谓的比较“劣等”的民族，就是像反犹主义的阴谋理论都非常有市场。好多华人我觉得就是觉得白人是高等民族，拉丁裔是劣等民族。美国的人口趋势拉丁裔比例不断升高，白人比例不断下降，生活在中国的对此欢欣鼓舞幸灾乐祸，生活在美国则也是很不爽，对Trump那些反墨西哥移民的言论很有共鸣，尽管他那些政策根本不现实。
Dracula 发表于 2016-11-5 02:37
我的看法和他差不多，不过我觉得他在种族问题上的话说的比较客气，我从网上论坛中得来的印象，从大陆出 ...
这社会本就是以贫富定高下，只是大家都装着，假装人人平等。
本帖最后由 Dracula 于 2016-11-7 04:12 编辑
Dracula 发表于 2016-11-3 05:17
今天离大选只有6天了。过去两个星期，希拉里坏消息连连。Wikileaks泄露的一些内幕，Obamacare价格的大幅度 ...
今天对大选形势最后更新一下。
现在同4天前相比，大选的形势没有什么变化。希拉里止住了民调下滑的势头，摇摆州基本上还是我几天前分析的情况。但是过去几天，希拉里在betting market上的获胜概率有不小的上升，由70%上升到78%，原因好像是early voting的结果对民主党不错。纽约时报1天前的报道，今年的early voting同2012年相比，白人的投票率有所上升，黑人的投票率有所下降，这对Trump是好消息，但是女性投票率相对男性增加的更多，拉丁裔的投票率有大幅度增长，这对希拉里是利好。可能赌博市场的分析是这个趋势整体来说对希拉里有利。但我个人的感觉还不是很确定。在Nevada，民调双方非常接近，但是early voting的结果，民主党有着很大的优势，尤其是在Nevada已经有70%的选民投票，在后天Trump想要追上这个差距已经是非常困难了。好多对这一结果的解释是，Nevada的拉丁裔人口比例挺大，好多拉丁裔的英语不怎么样，如果polling公司的调查只使用英语的话，就会低估希拉里的支持率。如果这个解释是对的话，那就意味着在Florida和Arizona这两个拉丁裔人口比例也很高的州，民调的结果可能也低估了希拉里的支持率。现在在这两个州的民调，双方是基本上持平，因此实际形势是希拉里领先也说不定。这两个州希拉里都可以输，但对Trump来说丢掉Florida就几乎肯定会输掉大选。因此希拉里的实际获胜概率可能会是比538的65%要高一些，但我也觉得Princeton的Sam Wang的99%的预测有点乐观的过分了。
本来我想写篇文章，聊一下2000年大选Florida的计票，包括hanging chad，dimple，undervote, overvote等等，以及最高法院Bush v. Gore的判决。不过最近很忙就不写了。大家要是谁感兴趣的话，我在这儿可以稍微解释一下。星期二大选结束，exit poll的结果出来后，我可能会最后在这儿分析一下。
Dracula 发表于 2016-11-7 04:02
今天对大选形势最后更新一下。
现在同4天前相比，大选的形势没有什么变化。希拉里止住了民调下滑的势头 ...
Comey刚刚宣布没有在新发现的希拉里邮件里找到什么特别的东西。这应该对希拉里还是个好消息。在betting market上，这个消息宣布后，她的获胜概率一下子就升到了83%。Trump本来的形势就不好，现在的话会更艰难。
Dracula 发表于 2016-11-7 05:24
Comey刚刚宣布没有在新发现的希拉里邮件里找到什么特别的东西。这应该对希拉里还是个好消息。在betting m ...
很奇怪美国选民真的会被这些消息影响吗？完全不理解。
更厌恶希拉里。
但特朗普如果当选后肯定会实行战略收缩，这就会给美国带来great again的可能，同时会让中国头脑发热去填补真空、进而重演七十年代美退苏进的一幕。
综上，还是希拉里上台对中国的长期利益更有利。
另外，希拉里上台后美国社会的分裂会更加显性化，是另一个大利好。
猫元帅 发表于 2016-11-7 11:45
很奇怪美国选民真的会被这些消息影响吗？完全不理解。
没找到什么vs找到一个大新闻的区别还是有的啊...
如果找到大新闻说犯法了,买凶杀人了,要立案侦查了,那肯定有区别吧
很不错的分析。
The Four Groups That Will Decide the Presidential Race
RONALD BROWNSTEIN
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/clinton-trump-demographics/506714/?utm_source=twb
For all the turmoil, turbulence, and sheer reality-show melodrama of the 2016 presidential campaign, the actual results appear more likely to deepen long-standing trends in the electorate than to shatter them.
That’s been one of the paradoxes of this extraordinary election year. With both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton facing unfavorable opinions from a majority of the voters, this has been a demolition derby of a campaign that has left both sides sputtering toward the finish line with dented fenders and cracked windshields. Yet a race that has unfolded like no other still appears on track to reinforce and intensify the trends that have defined the competition for the White House over the past quarter-century.
The polarizing nature of Trump’s candidacy in particular is pushing many of the dynamics that have shaped the electoral competition since the 1990s to new heights. With his brusque message of defensive nationalism, he is well positioned to extend the GOP advantage in some places where it is already strong, both demographically (working-class whites and evangelical Christians) and geographically (non-metropolitan areas, Appalachian and Interior Plains states). But he appears certain to compound the party’s problems among voters (college-educated and secular whites, minorities, Millennials) and in places (the nation’s largest urban centers, coastal states) where the GOP was already facing crippling deficits. In particular, the distance between blue-collar white voters drawn to Trump with passionate intensity and both the college whites and minorities resisting him may reach record heights.
The cumulative effect may leave Republicans relying even more heavily on the voters and regions most uneasy about the United States’ cultural and demographic change, or what I’ve called the “coalition of restoration.” Conversely, the election could substantially expand the Democratic advantage among the groups and regions most comfortable with those social changes, what I’ve called the “coalition of transformation.” Whoever wins, the safest prediction is that this election will widen every divide that fractures American politics—along lines of race, education, generation, and geography.
A Clinton victory would mean that Democrats have won the popular vote in six of the past seven presidential elections, or since 1992. That would be unprecedented: No party has won the popular vote six times in seven tries since the formation of the modern party system in 1828. Conversely, a Trump win would measure just how much separates a major portion of the electorate from the leadership class in virtually every American institution, ranging from business to national security to media, in the form of newspaper editorial boards—all of which have coalesced in virtually unprecedented fashion against the tumultuous GOP nominee.
A series of demographic and geographic factors will determine the result tomorrow, while also sending critical signals about the future direction of American politics. Together, those underlying elements amount to the tectonic plates of the 2016 election. Today we explore the key demographic plates that will shape the election’s outcome; tomorrow we will look at the principal geographic dynamics.
Does the class inversion deepen?
One of the defining characteristics of American politics over the past generation has been the class inversion: the reversal of political allegiance among blue- and white-collar white voters. Through the first decades after World War II, every Democratic nominee from Adlai Stevenson through Jimmy Carter consistently ran better among white voters without a college education than whites who held advanced degrees.
But Republican gains, starting in the late 1960s, among whites without degrees and Democratic advances among college-educated whites, which accelerated in the 1990s, have reversed that pattern. Starting with Al Gore in 2000, every Democratic nominee has won a higher share of the vote among whites with a college degree than whites without advanced education. In his first victory in 2008, President Obama ran seven points better among college-educated than non-college-educated whites, the widest such gap ever for a Democratic nominee.
This campaign seems poised to shatter that record and accelerate the class realignment of the two parties’ coalitions. From the outset of his candidacy, Trump has established a visceral connection with many non-college-educated white voters, especially men. Competing in a 17-person field in the GOP primary, Trump still won nearly half of all non-college-educated Republicans; he has led Clinton, usually by gaping margins, among that group in virtually every general-election national survey.
Republicans almost always now win working-class whites. The only Democrat to carry them since 1980 was Bill Clinton in 1992 and 1996, and he never attracted more than 44 percent of them. (That was enough for a slim plurality, though, because many working-class whites supported Ross Perot’s third-party candidacies.) The real question for Trump is how far he can push the margin among these voters. In each election since 2000, exit polls show that the GOP nominee has carried non-college-educated white voters by at least 17 percentage points; Mitt Romney won them by 26 points, drawing 62 percent of them in 2012. Pre-election polls show that Trump has a strong chance to extend that advantage. The ultimate mark of success for him would be to rival Ronald Reagan’s dominant performance in 1984, when he won 66 percent of non-college-educated whites, beating Walter Mondale among those voters by 32 percentage points. (Whether Trump can reach that high will likely depend largely on his performance among blue-collar white women, as discussed below.)
But while Trump has made these inroads among working-class whites, he faces unprecedented resistance among whites holding at least a four-year college degree. Though Democratic nominees now routinely run better among whites with a degree than those without one, none of them have run well enough to actually win most college-educated whites. In fact, no Democratic nominee in the history of modern polling, dating back to 1952, has ever won most whites holding a four-year degree or more, according to exit polls and the American National Election Studies. Hillary Clinton appears poised to break that record: Almost all pre-election polls have shown her leading among college-educated whites. She seems virtually certain to at least double, if not triple, the widest Democratic advantage ever among college-educated white women, which was Gore’s 8 percentage points in 2000. As of Saturday, the ABC News/Washington Post tracking poll gave her a thumping 25-percentage-point lead with these women.
Less clear is how college-educated white men will vote. Many of these ordinarily Republican-leaning voters—the GOP nominee has carried them by double digits in all but three elections since 1980—express skepticism toward both candidates, and polls have varied widely on their preferences. Some late surveys show more of them drifting back toward their usual Republican inclinations, though the ABC News/Washington Post tracking poll as of Saturday showed them breaking about evenly between the two rivals. At the least, Trump appears likely to fall well short of margins of 20 percentage points or more that these men have given the GOP nominee in three of the past four elections.
These contrasting trends among college-educated and non-college-educated white voters seem certain to produce a much wider gulf between the two groups than the record seven-point gap President Obama saw in 2008. In the final NBC News/Wall Street Journal national poll released Sunday, Clinton ran fully 22 points better among college-educated whites—leading among them and drawing 47 percent support—than non-college-educated whites, where she drew just 25 percent support. That could point to a lasting new order in American elections.
Two other trends in the class breakdown among whites are worth watching. One is regional variation. Democrats since 1992 have dominated the five key swing states in the Rustbelt—Ohio, Iowa, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—largely because they have performed slightly better among these states’ large populations of blue-collar whites than Democrats have among those voters nationally. Trump’s hopes may turn on whether he can end that advantage in enough states.
Conversely, one reason Democrats have struggled to penetrate the GOP hold on the South is that they have underperformed their showings elsewhere among college-educated whites, many of whom in Dixie are more culturally conservative than their counterparts in other regions. Hillary Clinton’s performance among college-educated whites in the suburbs of Charlotte and Raleigh will likely determine whether she recaptures North Carolina, which tilted to Romney in 2012 after Obama carried it four years earlier. Even if Hillary Clinton does not win Georgia or South Carolina, not to mention Texas, Democrats will be closely watching for signs of inroads in white-collar suburbs that would be indispensable to any future victories there. (The same is true of Arizona in the southwest.)
The last factor worth watching for is the turnout of white-collar and blue-collar white voters. The two main data sources on the electorate’s composition differ about the relative presence of the two groups, with the Census Bureau showing non-college-educated whites to be a larger share of the total vote than the exit polls conducted by a consortium of media organizations do. Yet, as America diversifies and education levels rise, both data sources have shown non-college-educated whites declining as a share of the electorate by about three percentage points every four years, with minorities steadily growing—as discussed below—and college whites either holding steady or slightly increasing.
Since 2012, a loud faction of GOP thinkers has argued that the key to the party’s revival was not so much broadening its reach to minority, Millennial, and socially liberal voters who have largely rejected the party, but increasing turnout among blue-collar, religiously conservative, and non-urban whites. No candidate seems better designed to execute that mission than Trump, who has built his campaign around both the priorities and resentments of working-class white America. Trump is generating huge margins with those voters, but he has also clearly demonstrated one flaw in that strategy: Any message polarizing enough to mobilize millions of “missing” blue-collar white voters also risks alienating not only minorities but many white-collar whites. The results will measure whether any votes Trump gained among blue-collar whites was equaled or exceeded by losses among minorities and white-collar whites. A Trump victory would provide validation for those who want the GOP to prioritize mobilizing conservative whites over outreach. But if the blowtorch intensity of Trump’s courtship can’t reverse the steady decline in non-college-educated whites’ share of the vote, the missing-white-voter theory will look like a dead end.
Does the minority presence continue growing?
Beyond the class inversion, the other key reason for the Democrats’ revival in presidential politics since 1992 is the growth of the minority population. Although change hasn’t come to the electorate as fast as it has to the overall society, the minority share of the vote has roughly doubled since 1992, whether one measures it from the exit poll or Census data. In 2012, the Census put the minority vote share, 26 percent, slightly below the level in the exit polls, 28 percent. But both show non-white voters rising by about two percentage points every four years as a portion of the total votes cast.
One reason for that growth in the total minority vote under President Obama was extraordinarily high levels of African American turnout; black voters actually turned out at slightly higher rates than whites in 2012. The Hillary Clinton campaign doesn’t expect black voters to reach that peak again; the initial trends in early voting among African Americans have prompted concern among Democrats that the slippage could be greater than they expected, though those fears eased somewhat by the weekend.
Yet, even if black turnout dips, the total minority vote share could rise anyway because non-whites represent a larger share of the eligible voter pool than they did four years ago. (A smaller percentage of a larger pool could still generate an increase in voters.) In particular, fully four million more Latinos are eligible to vote this year than in 2012, according to the Pew Research Center. In 2012, only a little less than half of eligible Latinos voted. But early voting among Latinos, driven by antipathy to Trump, has soared in key states. Long lines stretched deep into the Friday-night deadline for early voting in Las Vegas; in Florida, the Clinton campaign on Friday said more Latinos had already voted than in the entire early-voting period in 2012. Texas and Arizona have reported big spikes in participation, too.
Latino Decisions, a Democratic polling firm that focuses on Hispanic voters, initially projected that between 13.1 million and 14.7 million Latinos might vote in 2016, up from just over 11 million in 2012 and just under 10 million in 2008. But the surge in early voting has convinced them that those projections might be too low: Now they say it’s possible that Latinos reach 15 million. Population trends could also slightly bump up the combined share of the vote cast by Asian Americans and mixed-race voters from its five percent in 2012.
If the minority vote share continues rising along the roughly two-points-per-four-years trajectory of the past quarter-century, Trump’s hill will get steeper—and the missing-white-voter theory will grow more implausible. Margins matter, too. Before Obama, Republicans often won 10 percent to 12 percent of African Americans; if Trump can regain that modest foothold, it will boost him in states like Ohio, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina, and help him repel Hillary Clinton’s unexpected advance in Georgia. Trump made a steady push for black support during the general election, but is laboring under the stain of his leadership in the “birther” claim that Obama was not born in America, as well as his embrace of barbed law-and-order rhetoric in this campaign. Democrats are hoping that Trump’s sharp language on immigration will produce record margins for Hillary Clinton not only among Latinos, but also among Asian Americans. In 2012, exit polls showed Obama carrying Latinos by 44 percentage points and Asians by 47 points.
How far does the gender gap extend?
In January, one Republican strategist told me the gender gap in a Trump-Clinton election could resemble the Grand Canyon. That prediction looks prescient. The key to the gender gap’s magnitude may be how far into traditionally Republican groups Trump’s troubles among women extend. He’s facing cavernous deficits among women of color, but that’s not particularly unusual for a GOP nominee. As already noted, he also seems virtually guaranteed to lose college-educated white women by the biggest margin for a Republican ever. But those women usually tilt Democratic, too, if not by such decisive margins: Although Obama lost them by six points in 2012, the Democratic nominee had carried them in four of the previous five elections.
Trump would face even greater difficulties if he also cedes substantial ground among white women without a college education. These women, once described as “waitress moms,” are often economically strained and more culturally conservative than their white-collar counterparts, and they have typically leaned Republican. Bill Clinton in 1996 is the only Democratic presidential nominee to win them since 1980, and in each of the past three elections they have preferred the GOP nominee by at least 17 percentage points. Like the ordinarily Republican-leaning college-educated white men, these women have appeared torn between their partisan leanings and their ambivalence, if not hostility, toward Trump; both these groups have proven the most volatile in polling leading into the election. As of Saturday morning, the ABC News/Washington Post tracking poll showed Trump leading among these women by a resounding 34 percentage points, even greater than Reagan’s advantage in 1984; but an NBC News/SurveyMonkey poll released a few days earlier showed him holding a much more modest 12-percentage-point edge.
The marriage gap will be worth watching, too. Polls have shown Trump facing heavy resistance from single white women, who have voted Democratic in each election since 1992—although Obama’s margin among them sagged to just six percentage points in 2012, by far the smallest Democratic advantage over that period. Even more worrisome for Trump would be erosion among married white women, who have preferred Republicans in every election since 1984 and gave Romney a 25-percentage-point margin last time.
Trump is guaranteed to win white men, though his difficulties among those with college degrees mean he may struggle to match Romney’s 27-point advantage among all white men in 2012, which was the highest for Republicans since 1988. Since 1980, Bill Clinton in 1996 is the only Democrat to carry even a plurality of white women; Hillary Clinton has a real chance, though no guarantee, of becoming the second to do so.
Can Democrats retain their Millennial advantage?
Since the first Millennials cast presidential ballots in 2000, Democrats have built a widening advantage among young people. In 2000, when only the oldest Millennials voted, voters under 30 split about evenly between Gore, at 48 percent, and George W. Bush, at 46 percent. As more Millennials entered the electorate, John Kerry pushed that number to 54 percent in 2004, before Obama won two-thirds of younger voters in 2008. Obama suffered some erosion in 2012—he lost white Millennials after winning them four years earlier—but overall still captured 60 percent of voters under 30 in his reelection.
The stakes have increased in the battle for Millennial allegiance as the generation has swelled its presence in the electorate. This year, for the first time, Millennials will equal baby boomers as a share of eligible voters, though they won’t match the boomers as a portion of actual voters because they vote at lower rates. But by 2020, Millennials will be a larger share of eligible voters than any other generation, and they will almost certainly be the largest generation among actual voters, too. And for the first time in 2020, the post-Millennial generation will enter the electorate. The non-partisan States of Change project forecasts that by 2020, Millennials will represent 34 percent of eligible voters and post-Millennials another 3 percent. Those groups will race past the 28 percent of voters from the baby boom. (And by as soon as 2024, Millennials and post-Millennials will approach 45 percent of the electorate, while boomers will shrink to about one-fourth.)
This generational transition will dramatically accelerate the electorate’s racial reconfiguring. About 80 percent of baby boomers are white—largely because the United States virtually shut off immigration between 1924 and 1965. But 44 percent of Millennials, and nearly 49 percent of the post-Millennials, are non-white, according to calculations by Bill Frey, a Brookings Institution demographer. The contrast between an increasingly diverse youth population, and a preponderantly white senior population—what I’ve called “the brown and the gray”—seems likely to dominate American politics for years to come.
Hillary Clinton has never connected easily with Millennials: Obama carried nearly 60 percent of them against her in their 2008 primary duel, and she lost 71 percent of them to Bernie Sanders during this year’s Democratic primary, faring about as poorly among Millennial women as men. But polls have consistently shown that Trump is deeply unpopular with this group, with large proportions describing him as racist, disrespectful to women, and unqualified for the presidency. At a time when Millennials recognize they embody the United States’ increasingly diverse future, Trump has stamped the GOP to many of them as a party determined to restore a past dominated by white men.
Despite Millennial ambivalence about Hillary Clinton, late surveys showed them moving toward her in much greater numbers than earlier in the campaign, when many expressed support for Gary Johnson or Jill Stein. Republicans face the very real risk of a third consecutive wipeout with Millennial voters—and the possibility that their nominee may attract less than 30 percent of them just as they are on the verge of becoming the electorate’s largest generation.
Hillary Clinton hasn’t particularly inspired Millennials, but even more than Obama she has aligned the Democrats’ agenda with those voters’ priorities on criminal-justice reform, immigration, gay rights, gun control, and climate change, to name a few subjects. If she wins, she will have the opportunity to cement the Democrats’ hold on them. For Republicans, further alienating the Millennial generation—and the even more diverse young people who will begin filing into voting booths behind them in 2020—may be the heaviest price that Donald Trump’s candidacy imposes on the party, even if he overtakes Hillary Clinton by mobilizing his impassioned coalition centered on older and blue-collar whites.
相对于中国来说，谁上台都不是也不可能是为中国说话的，大选过程的宣传效果对于中国来说足够了，可以说世界格局已经开始彻底转向多极化了。美国人自己玩的这些个东西，照中国历史上的说法，礼崩乐坏了，基本上没有可能“待从头收拾旧山河”这种可能了吧。
今天晚上除了总统大选外，还有一个看点就是国会。参议院涉及到最高法院法官的任命，目前是共和党54席，民主党46席。如果希拉里获胜的话，民主党需要增加4个席位就能获得参议院多数。在1个星期多以前，民主党希望很大，甚至有可能达到52、53席，但是James Comey给国会的第一封信之后，共和党形势反转，现在非常胶着。今年这三分之一的席位，上次大选是2010年，共和党大胜，因此这次竞争激烈的席位的incumbent主要是共和党。民主党就是Harry Reid在Nevada的席位，从Nevada的early voting的情况来看，保住应该问题不大。Illinois是民主党肯定会拿下。New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Missouri, North Carolina则是形势非常接近，很难说。Florida的incumbent是Marco Rubio，本来民主党很希望搞掉他，但他在拉丁裔里的动员工作做得很不错，现在看来是能保住席位。这次大选，好几个共和党参议员包括John McCain提到希拉里的最高法院法官提名不论是谁，他们都不会接受，宁可让最高法院法官的人数定格在8个人。因此如果这次民主党赢得总统和参议院的话，民主共和两党有可能在这个问题上发生剧烈冲突，很有可能在最高法院法官任命上filibuster的制度会被废除。
在众议院，共和党几乎肯定会继续控制。但是他们的多数很可能会降低。现在共和党的多数是30人，我看到的预测，民主党可能会夺回10到20席。不管这次总统大选是谁赢，共和党Trump和Ryan两派的内战都会在大选后继续。共和党在众议院控制的多数减少后，更偏激的偏向Trump的freedom caucus的影响会变得更强，如果不违反Hastert Rule（通过议案需要majority of majority，也就是说多数党的多数必须投赞成票）的话，法案会更难以通过，Paul Ryan的日子也会更不好过。甚至1月初的众议院议长的选举都可能会选不上。