鳕鱼邪恶
发表于 2016-2-23 01:14:52
总之是一蟹不如一蟹~{:204:}
MacArthur
发表于 2016-2-23 01:52:53
本帖最后由 MacArthur 于 2016-2-22 12:55 编辑
holycow 发表于 2016-2-22 12:14
...现在要打选战,townhall,她这个高高在上的短板暴露无遗。
她的Townhall Meeting画风基本上都是这个样子。。。
Gocha! Hahaha...
{:187:}
holycow
发表于 2016-2-23 09:00:35
冰蚁 发表于 2016-2-22 08:12
不过就给这几个候选人相面的话,trump 感觉最有总统相。哇哈哈。
Cruz快被川普和鲁彪两个乱枪打死了,哈哈哈太好看了{:191:}
MacArthur
发表于 2016-2-23 10:23:07
holycow 发表于 2016-2-22 20:00
Cruz快被川普和鲁彪两个乱枪打死了,哈哈哈太好看了
连党鞭Kevin都出来打Cruz同学的太平拳了
{:187:}
Dracula
发表于 2016-2-23 23:11:22
晨枫 发表于 2016-2-2 22:26
伯爵可能以前介绍过,我漏过了,能不能再介绍一下:Ted Cruz和Mark Rubio的政纲到底是什么?还有Hillary...
刚看到的
Marco Rubio: full-blooded conservatism with a smile
To some the Republicans’ best hope is a shallow opportunist; to others, an extremist. Might Marco Rubio be both?
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21693424-some-republicans-best-hope-shallow-opportunist-others-extremist-might
http://cdn.static-economist.com/sites/default/files/imagecache/full-width/images/2016/02/articles/main/20160227_usp505.jpg
HIS father Mario, a struggling bartender; Oriales, a hotel maid and devoted mother; Pedro, his garrulous, cigar-smoking grandfather, known to the grandchildren as Papá; an elder brother, also Mario, who became a Green Beret: the supporting cast in Marco Rubio’s back-story is a technicolour pageant of striving Cuban immigrants turned patriotic Americans. If Mr Rubio somehow manages to seize the Republican nomination from Donald Trump—a feat that, after his second-place finish in South Carolina, he seems best-placed to achieve—Americans will hear his story often. But what, exactly, is its moral?
In Mr Rubio’s telling, his biography is a fable of America, which “changed the history of my family”. In no other country could someone who, as a child, was taken by his father to ogle the dreamlike mansions of the rich, rise to the Senate, and possibly beyond. It follows that America must not forsake its rugged individualism: “We don’t want to become like the rest of the world,” Mr Rubio insists, delighting his many fellow exceptionalists.
It is also, of course, a story about Mr Rubio’s own exceptionalism—as some voters, knowing American meritocracy is often more promise than reality, intuitively understand. “It’s really cool,” said a young man cradling a baby after a rally in Rock Hill, South Carolina, “that he could navigate through all these obstacles—it wasn’t just handed to him on a silver platter”. The contrast with some other candidates, privileged in money, schooling or connections, is plain. As for his difficulties with mortgage payments and ill-advised property dealings, which some have used against him: Mr Rubio adduces them, like his student debt and rueful talk of post-dating cheques in pinched times, as yet more evidence that he alone can “talk to people who are living the way I grew up”.
With its hardscrabble, everyman beginning, the tale also has a gratifyingly upbeat pay-off, featuring a photogenic family—his student-sweetheart wife is a former Miami Dolphins cheerleader—as well as success. And, as no other candidate could, Mr Rubio recounts all this as insinuatingly as a Hollywood weepie. Were he not a politician, it has been said, he could have been a televangelist; he might also have made it as a stand-up comic. His scripted jokes are actually funny, and, contrary to the impression created by his robotronic malfunction in the Republican debate in New Hampshire, he ad-libs with an easy charm. He can explain complex subjects, such as the national debt, persuasively. He banters about hip-hop.
These attributes bolster his claim that, in a field of Republican gargoyles, he is likeliest to prevail in November. Yet the longer he remains in the race, the louder two key criticisms will become. They seem contradictory, but both contain elements of truth. One is that, beneath the altar-boy haircut, winning smile, chirpy voice, football talk, jokes and jokes about football, Mr Rubio is as ideologically extreme as anyone in the contest. The other is that the feel-good narrative masks a void.
The pollster in the sky
“Marco Rubio,” Jeb Bush once said, “makes me cry”, a remark that would have been prophetic had he not added “for joy”. Mr Bush was Florida’s governor during Mr Rubio’s lightning rise through its house of representatives, which took him, in short order, from whip, to majority leader, to become, aged 34 (he is now 44), its first Cuban-American speaker. Alongside the portraits of his grizzlier predecessors that hang in the capitol in Tallahassee, his is startlingly boyish. Mr Bush presented him with a sword, symbolising conservatism; at least, that is what it symbolised then.
Strikingly, in the tussle that ended with Mr Bush’s withdrawal on February 20th—a face-off that, in a saner primary season, might have been the headline drama—most of Florida’s Republican establishment lined up behind the former governor. “They all went one in one direction like fish in a tank,” says Johnnie Byrd, a previous Florida speaker and among the minority who favoured Mr Rubio. Gratitude for Mr Bush’s patronage helps explain why the “Jebbies” picked him; some may just have jumped too early. But the preference also reflects a sense, even among the operators in Tallahassee, that the younger man’s breakneck ambition was offputting. Dwelling on opinion polls, fundraising, the mechanics of the game, Mr Rubio’s memoir, “An American Son”, reinforces the image of a pure politician. “Did God read polls?” he asks when, during his long-shot bid for the Senate in 2010, his wife tells him to trust the Almighty.
Both the resentment, and the air of weightless ambition, have been reinforced by his luck. For if Mr Rubio could not rely on a parental Rolodex, as he puts it, his career has been blessed in other ways: seats opening up at serendipitous moments, money and well-paid jobs magically materialising. Norman Braman, a Miami car-dealing tycoon, took a lucrative shine to him, donating generously and employing his wife. Not long after he secured the Florida speakership, Mr Rubio landed a $300,000-a-year post at a politically connected legal firm (he once specialised in land-use law). Some of his jobs were not terribly demanding, suggesting, to his critics, a pattern of absenteeism stretching to his poor attendance record in the Senate.
“He’s just like Barack Obama”, worried a woman in Florence, where Tim Scott, a South Carolinian senator, whooped Mr Rubio onto the stage like a boxing announcer. The implicit concern is that he has more offices to his name than achievements, or, some say, principles. They point, above all, to his gymnastics over immigration: running for the Senate, he opposed a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants, then embraced it as part of a doomed reform in 2013; now, in the xenophobic heat of the campaign, he downplays that idea, arguing that terrorism has upended even unrelated aspects of his policy. (This revision could forfeit some of the Hispanic votes that Republican apparatchiks covet—though given the tensions between Hispanic communities, confidence that he would deliver them might be naive.)
Still, anyone who thinks Mr Rubio entirely devoid of convictions should watch his farewell speech in Tallahassee in 2008. “God is real,” Mr Rubio passionately declared: “He loves you...whether you are an embryo or behind bars.” God’s providence, and Mr Rubio’s gratitude for it, often feature in his story. His faith is longstanding: as a boy, he would don a sheet after mass and pretend to be a priest. (It is also ecumenical: in Miami, he attends both Catholic and Baptist churches, and during a childhood spell in Las Vegas went to a Mormon one.)
And for all his pole-climbing, his philosophy has been consistent. A better reading of his flip-flop-flip on immigration may be that his liberal stance was an anomaly. His tougher line today—no Syrian refugees; fewer family-reunion visas—fits into an ultra-conservative outlook that his story has sometimes camouflaged.
Smile and smile and be a Tea Partier
A standard critique of Republican strategy is that it exploits social issues to divide and distract groups whose economic interests lie in more redistributive government. Mr Rubio’s tactic, alleges an old adversary from his days in Florida politics, is to “use as a shield to push forward his agenda”. Or, as Mr Rubio writes in his memoir of Barack Obama: “his personality and language gave an impression of moderation, but his ideas and voting record” revealed a zealot.
Take his avowed commitment to helping the little guy. He acknowledges the alienation some members of minorities feel, drawing on his own experiences in cosmopolitan Miami. He speaks warmly of early intervention for disadvantaged toddlers, and of leniency towards mildly straying youngsters. He can be insightful about America’s precarious place in a globalised, post-industrial economy. But when it comes to taxation, his priorities lie elsewhere. One of his favourite lines is that the poor are not made richer by making the rich poorer. Under his plans there is no fear of that: his proposal to scrap taxes on capital-gains and dividends would instead make the rich richer.
The exigencies of the primaries have sharpened Mr Rubio’s tone. But, in content, he is a veteran hardliner. Dan Gelber, formerly the Democratic minority leader in the Florida house, calls him “the best spokesman that the severe right-wing could ever hope for” (adding that he “was never dishonest or disreputable”). Indeed, while Mr Rubio is more clubbable than his fire-breathing rival Ted Cruz—witness his ongoing stream of endorsements from congressmen and governors—he and Mr Cruz, another Cuban immigrant’s son and devout first-term senator, have more in common than either cares to admit.
For example, though Mr Rubio doesn’t deny climate change, as Mr Cruz does, he says, in effect, that America shouldn’t do much about it. He claims gun controls fail wherever they are tried. Like Mr Cruz he wants to abolish the department of education; ditto, naturally, Obamacare. He opposes abortion unless the mother’s life is endangered. He wants the legalisation of gay marriage to be reversed.
His upbringing shaped his global outlook as well as his morality. His focus on foreign affairs may partly be designed to imbue his youthfulness with gravitas. But it can also be traced to the seething entrepôt of Miami-Dade, which, quips Mr Gelber, may be the only county with a foreign policy. What he somewhat prematurely calls “the Rubio doctrine” reflects the congenital neoconservatism of many exiles: he may not be quite as hawkish as his revered Papá, who thought Margaret Thatcher should invade Argentina as well as the Falklands, but it is close. He says he would cancel the nuclear deal with Iran on his first day in office, and undo the normalisation of relations with Cuba. He wants to send American troops into Syria, and take on Bashar al-Assad and Islamic State at once. He threatens to pack off more terrorists to Guantánamo.
The final chapter
“Just because someone is wrong,” Mr Rubio says, “doesn’t mean they are bad”. Wrong is wrong, however, and, beyond the politesse, he shows little appetite for compromise on the neuralgic issues that will continue to divide America under its next president. That might hamstring him in the White House; more immediately, it might prevent him reaching it. His well-honed formula—robust conservatism with a smile—will attract some voters who share his instincts but are repelled by harsher rhetoric. Whether it can convert moderates in sufficient numbers is unclear.
That is where the story comes in. “It makes him a whole person, a real person”, said a supporter in a barn in Gilbert, as the obligatory country music rolled. Transmuting astringent economics into compassion, promising tolerance without a cost, wreathing jeremiads in sunshine, the story might even do the trick. Mr Rubio’s inauguration is the climax its logic demands. In the end, its meaning is simple. The moral of the story is its teller, Marco Rubio.
晨枫
发表于 2016-2-24 05:05:21
Dracula 发表于 2016-2-23 09:11
刚看到的
Marco Rubio: full-blooded conservatism with a smile
谢谢,拜读中
holycow
发表于 2016-2-24 14:14:09
Dracula 发表于 2016-2-23 07:11
刚看到的
Marco Rubio: full-blooded conservatism with a smile
Rubio是GOP候选人里,conservatives里面最moderate的一个,或者moderates里面最conservative的一个,怎么说都行,那不是重点。
我观察下来,这个人压力之下的判断力有问题,这点和奥巴马正好相反 -- 奥巴马是个很冷静,有算计的人,重压之下也不会改变。
冰蚁
发表于 2016-2-24 22:07:36
holycow 发表于 2016-2-24 01:14
Rubio是GOP候选人里,conservatives里面最moderate的一个,或者moderates里面最conservative的一个,怎么 ...
rubio 的面相给人 hold 不住的感觉。
{:191:}
mark
发表于 2016-2-24 22:13:35
哈,如我所言吧,你们太低估川普了。川普的打法是完全市场营销的打法。他简直就是把自己当成商品在做营销。定位准确,口号简洁有力,连我这种不关心美国政治的人都能记住他的竞选口号。竞选策略,有取有舍。商品市场上万金油的产品是讨不到好的,能卖得动的产品一定是有特点的产品,哪怕有一些缺陷。
凡卡
发表于 2016-2-25 00:32:22
MacArthur 发表于 2016-2-23 01:52
她的Townhall Meeting画风基本上都是这个样子。。。
哎玛,等会睡觉会做噩梦
Dracula
发表于 2016-2-25 00:58:00
刚看到一篇挺有意思的关于superpac 的文章。
Twilight of the Super PAC
The campaign groups are enriching the people who run them—but are they helping anyone else?
DAVID FRUM
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/super-pacs-2016/470697/
In his standard stump speech, Senator Bernie Sanders vows that millionaires and billionaires will no longer be able to buy elections if he wins the presidency. But what if the most venal corruptors of American democracy are not the buyers but the sellers—and their self-interested agents?
Late Sunday night, CNN reported a remarkable allegation. An anonymous Jeb Bush bundler estimated that Mike Murphy, the director of Bush’s Right to Rise, had billed the super PAC $14 million for his services—more than 10 percent of all the super PAC’s revenues. Murphy fiercely disputed the claim, and the next day CNN updated the original post with additional information.
As you read, ask yourself how you’d feel about this explanation if it were your donation at issue, especially the phrases I’ve bolded for emphasis:
Charlie Spies, the attorney and treasurer for the Bush-allied super PAC Right to Rise, said the Bush bundler's characterization was wildly inaccurate.
"That amount is wildly wrong, not even in the ballpark of what Mike's potential compensation could have been," said Spies. "We put vendor per vendor compensation caps in place to ensure that nobody made more than a certain amount of money. That amount is confidential, as is standard for most contracts; we have confidentiality provisions." Refuting the anonymous bundler's assertion, Spies added that "there is no way any so-called bundler would have any idea how much any vendor was making. The only people who would have any way of knowing that are the vendor themselves, myself as a treasurer and counselor, or our governance committee, which is a three person committee of senior donors and political leaders that was put in place to make sure that all compensation was reasonable and something donors would be comfortable with."
In other words: “How dare you accuse us of wasting money! Because of our total non-transparency, there’s no way any of our supporters can know whether we’ve used their money wisely or not!”
Super PACs are new phenomena in American politics. They are a product of two judicial decisions: the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, delivered in January 2010, and the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Speechnow.org v. Federal Election Commission, two months later. Together, these two decisions enabled the creation of a new entity: a political action committee that could accept unlimited donations so long as it did not coordinate its expenditure with any political campaign.
Advocates of campaign-spending limits were left aghast. In his 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama delivered a rare—perhaps unique—reprimand to the Supreme Court justices assembled in a row only a few yards away from him. “With all due deference to separation of powers, last week the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special interests—including foreign corporations—to spend without limit in our elections.”
And the spending came: hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars of political spending, denominated in gifts in the millions and tens of millions and even hundreds of millions.
But what did it all buy?
In an interview on election night 2012, Chris Wallace challenged Karl Rove: “ Crossroads, which you helped found, spent—what?—$325 million, and we’ve ended up with the same president, the same Democratic majority in the Senate, and the same Republican majority in the House. Was it worth it?”
Many donors expressed similar frustrations, in public and—even more forcefully—in private.
American Crossroads would soon fade from the scene. Fundraising would decline to $100 million in 2014. In that year, Crossroads backed eight U.S. Senate candidates. Six lost. The two who won had received comparatively minuscule amounts, leading some to scoff that Crossroads had achieved a return on investment of only 1 percent.
Along with the noisy grumbling about Crossroads’ effectiveness, more unnerving doubts were quietly expressed within the conservative world. Had the money all been spent on the intended purposes? Had too much been spent on salaries, fees, expenses, and other forms of personal inurement? Politico’s Ken Vogel reported these whisperings in his June 2014 book, Big Money—and predicted Crossroads’ likely demise. In the current cycle, Crossroads has only spent $116,495 to date, according to the tally kept by OpenSecrets.org.
Disappointment did not, however, lead to disillusionment. After all, the super PAC connected to the Mitt Romney presidential campaign—Restore Our Future—had delivered powerful results. During the 2012 primary season, the ad barrage launched by Restore Our Future had crushed one Romney alternative after another. Restore Our Future saved the day during Romney’s moment of maximum danger: the 10 days between his 12-point defeat by Newt Gingrich in the January 22 South Carolina primary and his crushing 14.5-point victory in Florida on January 31. The Super PAC fired off $15.4 million on television and radio advertising in Florida, 92 percent of it negative. “Of all the spots that ran in Florida for the last week, 68 percent were attacks on Newt Gingrich,” The New York Times reported on primary day.
It was this experience that convinced so many people, pundits and professionals alike, that Donald Trump could not win in 2016. Yes, he might start with a big bump of media attention. But that the decisive moment, the super PACs would open their guns upon him—and down he’d go.
The 2016 super PACs certainly had the funds to do it! In addition to the nine-digit haul at Right to Rise, super PACs aligned with Ted Cruz, John Kasich, Marco Rubio, and Scott Walker all raised amounts somewhere between handsome and staggering. Yet in this Republican presidential contest, “never in the history of political campaigns has so much, bought so little, so fleetingly.”
Or more exactly…
Never has so much bought so little of what it was meant to buy. Obviously the funds expended on behalf of Jeb Bush have bought a great deal for a great many people. Even if the estimate of Mike Murphy’s take is overstated—or possibly confuses gross billings by his firm with net income to himself—the 2016 super PACs have provided princely incomes for their principals and comfortable livelihoods for hundreds more. The question that is bound to occur to super PAC donors is: “Are we being cheated?” Increasingly, super PACs look like the political world’s equivalent of hedge funds: institutions that charge vastly above-market fees to deliver sub-market returns.
Disgust with the costly ineffectiveness of super PACs may explain one of the most important mysteries of the current phase of the 2016 campaign. We keep hearing that Marco Rubio has replaced Jeb Bush as the new darling of establishment Republicans. Yet Rubio’s fundraising has lagged. Rubio’s super PAC, Conservative Solutions, raised $14.4 million in the second half of 2015—the period in which Jeb Bush’s candidacy cratered. In January 2016, by which time Bush was plainly doomed, and Rubio cast by almost all reporters as theoretical front-runner, Conservative Solutions raised only $2.46 million.
That’s not going to stop anybody, least of all Donald Trump, who not only leads nationwide, but (as of mid-January) is ahead by 26 points in Rubio’s must-win Florida.
A long time ago, I wrote a history of the 1970s. One of its sub-themes was the emergence of the post-Watergate campaign-finance system. I was surprised to learn that some of the strongest proponents of limits on campaign donations were the donors themselves. Many had felt extorted by the 1972 Richard Nixon re-election campaign. That campaign had targeted executives in federally regulated industries, notably aviation, with a strong message of “Nice little price-regulated airline you have here, it would be a shame if the president’s appointees disapproved your requests for fare increases to keep pace with inflation.” The president of American Airlines was asked for gift equivalent to one-quarter of his annual salary. The squeeze was so tight that executives at many companies succumbed to the temptation to seek artful contrivances to reimburse themselves from the company treasury—a serious violation of the law. (18 corporations were successfully prosecuted for illegal donations to the Nixon campaign.) In testimony to Congress, corporate executives insisted that they would gratefully welcome a legal excuse to say “No” to political demands.
And flashing forward in time, one has to wonder: How voluntary, really, were those gifts to Right to Rise? The campaign finance system is often described as organized bribery, but to many of those writing the checks, it must often feel like organized blackmail. How many would have appreciated some way to reply to the call from the Jeb Bush campaign: “Sure! Gladly! Love Jeb! Happy to give the legal maximum!”—in a world in which the legal maximum was $5,000 or $10,000 or $25,000. Like all human beings, multimillionaires have finite funds and infinite possibilities to expend those funds. Some must regard the local hospital or the homeless shelter or the city opera or their alma mater as more deserving causes than the ambitions of this politician or that. But the politician can retaliate, and the hospital, the homeless shelter, the opera, and the alma mater cannot. So it’s the politician who shoves his or her way to the head of the giving queue.
But having shoved his or her way forward, how much does the politician truly benefit from the super-PAC system? The politician’s natural interest is to spend as little as possible on consultants’ fees. That’s not in the consultants’ interest, obviously. The effect of the super PAC system is to put the consultants, not the politicians, in charge of the largest pools of political money—and then to wrap those consultants’ takings in layer upon layer of non-transparency and non-accountability.
In his final weeks as a candidate, Jeb Bush often pointed out that he was the one candidate most willing to tangle with Donald Trump. That was true of the words he spoke from his own mouth. But that’s not how his super PAC spent its money. “Trump has had few better allies than Right to Rise,” observed Stephen Hayes in the Weekly Standard. "Right to Rise, like an all-pro right guard, helped clear a path for Trump by blocking several of his would-be tacklers, in particular Marco Rubio.”
Is this really what Jeb Bush would have wished? Is this what he’d wish now—now that Trump seems to be driving inexorably toward the nomination? Or is this a case of a staff on autopilot spending other people’s money to advance its own agenda—while taking a slice of every dollar for themselves as they did so?
On the other hand, perhaps it is what Jeb Bush would wish. Perhaps Jeb Bush's resentment of Marco Rubio raged so intensely that he’d rather see his worst political enemy win the Republican nomination than his former political protégé. Perhaps Bush preferred to wreck his party to exact his revenge. In which case, all those lovely valedictories to Jeb Bush’s high character would seem radically misplaced.
We’ll never know the truth, because the super PAC system insulates politicians from responsibility for the ugliest things their supporters do. After it’s all over, Jeb Bush will claim that it was not he personally, but a zombie super PAC beyond his control, that preferred Trump to Rubio. Don’t blame me, Jeb Bush will say—blame Murphy. And the Republican world will do it. The Republican world already is doing it. And isn’t taking the blame part of why they pay you the big bucks?
qyangroo
发表于 2016-2-25 01:49:22
Dracula 发表于 2016-2-25 00:58
刚看到一篇挺有意思的关于superpac 的文章。
Twilight of the Super PAC
奥巴马的成功已经证明了互联网和新媒体对草根的巨大号召。Super PAC 是亡羊补牢,没补上还成了票房毒药。
希拉里的竞选资金用的更聪明一些,用分钱给各地民主党部的方式,对拉超级选票有好处。
leekai
发表于 2016-2-25 16:29:47
mark 发表于 2016-2-24 22:13
哈,如我所言吧,你们太低估川普了。川普的打法是完全市场营销的打法。他简直就是把自己当成商品在做营销。 ...
高见!太佩服了。
Dracula
发表于 2016-3-1 02:59:09
刚看到的一篇文章。原文很长,我只贴过来开头的一小部分。
The Die-Hard Republicans Who Say #NeverTrump
By Megan McArdle
Over the past week, as it’s begun to sink in that -- no foolin’ -- Donald Trump might really be the nominee, I began to notice a trend among family and friends who are stalwart Republicans. These are people who consistently vote, and consistently vote (R) straight down the line. And they are tortured because they cannot bring themselves to vote for the Republican nominee this year, if the Republican nominee is Trump.
“She’s beside herself,” my mother said of a near relation, who is apparently seriously considering voting for a Democrat for the first time. I wanted to understand this phenomenon better. I asked on Twitter whether this was a real thing, just as the hashtag #NeverTrump began trending. And I got an earful. So I invited lifelong Republicans who had decided that they couldn’t vote for Trump in the general, even if he got the nomination, to tell me their stories. Hundreds of e-mails poured in, and are still arriving. They're informative.
What surprised me? First, the sheer number of people who sat down and composed lengthy e-mails on a weekend.
Second, the passion they showed. These people are not quietly concerned about Trump. They are appalled, repulsed, afraid and dismayed that their party could have let this happen. They wrote in the strongest possible language, and many were adamant that they would not stay home on Election Day, but in fact would vote for Hillary Clinton in the general and perhaps leave the Republican Party for good.
Third was the sheer breadth. I got everything from college students to Midwestern farmers to military intelligence officers to former officials in Republican administrations, one of whom said he would “tattoo #NeverTrump” on a rather delicate part of his anatomy if it would keep Donald J. Trump from becoming the nominee. They were from all segments of the party -- urban professionals, yes, but also stalwart evangelicals, neoconservatives, libertarians, Tea Partiers, the whole patchwork of ideological groups of which the Republican coalition is made.
Fourth was what they didn’t say. Some people talked about economic liberty issues, like taxes, or Obamacare, but that was a minority. “Lack of substance” was another minor issue -- often present, but never alone.
The main arguments were his authoritarianism, his lack of any principle besides the further aggrandizement of one Donald J. Trump, his racism and misogyny, and his erratic behavior, which led a whole lot of people to write that they were afraid to have him anywhere within a thousand miles of the nuclear launch codes.
后面的在
http://bloombergview.com/articles/2016-02-29/the-die-hard-republicans-who-say-nevertrump
王不留
发表于 2016-3-1 04:30:34
MacArthur 发表于 2016-2-23 01:52
她的Townhall Meeting画风基本上都是这个样子。。。
牙真好。。。。这么大年纪了。。
王不留
发表于 2016-3-1 04:32:31
Dracula 发表于 2016-2-23 23:11
刚看到的
Marco Rubio: full-blooded conservatism with a smile
太年轻了。。跟希大妈斗,必死。。
tanis
发表于 2016-3-1 10:58:11
Dracula 发表于 2016-3-1 02:59
刚看到的一篇文章。原文很长,我只贴过来开头的一小部分。
The Die-Hard Republicans Who Say #NeverTrump ...
看了伯爵转的开头。 按现在已有的投票结果看,这些人是少数啊~ 明天Super Tuesday,快要见分晓了~:)
常挨揍
发表于 2016-3-1 15:34:39
王不留 发表于 2016-3-1 04:32
太年轻了。。跟希大妈斗,必死。。
不过真看不出民主党有啥连任的本钱{:202:}
冰蚁
发表于 2016-3-1 20:46:06
tanis 发表于 2016-2-29 21:58
看了伯爵转的开头。 按现在已有的投票结果看,这些人是少数啊~ 明天Super Tuesday,快要见分晓了~:) ...
确实,马上就都会清晰了。哈哈哈。拭目以待
删除失败
发表于 2016-3-2 22:55:28
本帖最后由 删除失败 于 2016-3-2 22:56 编辑
希大妈和川普还是赢下了超级星期二
http://n.sinaimg.cn/news/transform/20160302/W7vH-fxpvysv5111889.gif
川普这初看搅局的货要真当上美国总统不知会是怎样一番景象