TA的每日心情 | 慵懒 2020-7-26 05:11 |
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签到天数: 1017 天 [LV.10]大乘
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从Schenck到Brandenburg,美国言论自由标准的演变(二):两次世界大战之间
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% `3 N& U: U( p+ l; s从1920年到1940年这段时间,美国人从法律界,知识界,媒体乃至政府官员都开始反思一战期间对反对意见的极端不容忍。从亢奋平静下来之后,当时那些反战,反征兵制的言论事后看并没有对国家安全造成多么大的威胁。而大多数美国人也都逐渐转为孤立主义,认为一战参战是极大的错误,那些意见似乎还有先见之明。在最高法院,尽管1920至1927年的判决还都是认为政府限制,惩罚言论的法律不违宪,但是判决多数逐渐在向Holmes和Brandeis的 立场靠拢。从1927年到二战爆发之前的绝大多数案子里,最高法院都站在了言论自由一边,clear and present danger也逐渐成为极端主义言论自由问题上的公认标准。& R6 N& ]" k1 E
& l# {6 ?3 @( J1919年至1920年这段时间在美国历史上被称作第一次红色恐慌。各地爆发工人大罢工。Luigi Galleani 的无政府主义团伙多次制造恐怖爆炸事件,连司法部部长A. Mitchell Palmer的家都被炸成了瓦砾,美国民众觉得暴力革命似乎也就要在美国发生,陷入了极度愤怒和恐慌,强烈要求政府采取严厉措施打击共产主义,无政府主义等激进组织。司法部大范围逮捕激进组织成员,不是美国公民的好多被驱逐出境。而各州也采取行动。32个州通过法律,悬挂红旗作为反抗政府的象征成为非法,最高可判10年。另有26个州通过anti-syndicalist 法律,禁止公开鼓吹暴力推翻政府。接下来的几个案子大都同第一次红色恐慌时期通过的这些法律有关。
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7 p) `6 N% |. b8 w, W/ `(我在钱伯斯小传里谈到过第一次红色恐慌,大家如果想对其多了解一点的话,可以看一下那篇文章。http://www.aswetalk.org/bbs/thread-28062-1-1.html)
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3 x& p0 S' v6 w3 n7 f+ j: F6 VBenjamin Gitlow是美国社会党的重要成员,美国共产党的建立者之一,1917年被选为纽约州议会的议员。十月革命之后他的政治观点变得越来越激进,创办了The Revolutionary Age这本杂志,1919年7月刊登了左翼宣言书(The Left Wing Manifesto),号召无产阶级革命。随着司法部对激进势力的打击,他在11月8日被捕,罪名是违反了纽约的禁止公开鼓吹暴力推翻政府的法律。他被发现有罪,判了5至10年。# f/ \6 a# _4 c$ P( a6 Z; O
6 d3 K/ q4 u$ [9 N案子上诉到最高法院,以7比2多数维持原判。虽然这一判决仍然是支持政府对言论自由的限制,但是多数意见里开始对批评政府政策和号召用非法手段推翻政府的言论进行区分。Edward Terry Sanford认为革命的火种虽小,但是一旦成为燎原之势会带来毁灭性的后果,因此Gitlow的宣言书不是什么抽象的言论,而是实实在在的行动,对Sanford来说已经是clear and present danger。在Holmes和Brandeis的反对意见,则认为Gitlow他们只是一小撮人,号召的革命是在未来不确定的时间,在目前没有任何可能导致革命,对他们来说,这种威胁并不是clear and present。虽然最高法院的这一判决仍然支持政府对言论自由的限制,但是多数的意见已经在向Holmes的立场接近。
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( o4 Q% q- i# N. R7 F5 Q8 C(尽管Benjamin Gitlow输了上诉,纽约州州长Al Smith却将其赦免。1928年大选,Gitlow 是工人党副总统候选人。1929年初,他成为美国共产党的最高领导人之一。但就在此时斯大林开始对其之前的盟友布哈林开火,将其开除出政治局。Gitlow和他的好友美共总书记Jay Lovestone都是布哈林派,也随之被开除出党。30年代他的思想逐渐变得保守,到30年代末已经变为坚定的反共产主义者,1939年在HUAC作证,1940年出版自传,对共产主义的危害进行剖析。1965年去世。)1 |* J0 F% ^7 u3 \# ^- h: L
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Whitney v. California的被告Anita Whitney,出身富贵,她的舅舅包括最高法院法官Stephen Field和华尔街大亨Cyrus Field。1893年当她访问纽约的贫民区时,被大为触动,投入激进活动,争取妇女选举权,1919年美国共产党成立时,她是最早的一批党员。1919年11月,她发表演讲,攻击美国的种族歧视问题,随后被捕,理由是美国共产党是阴谋颠覆政府的组织,而她被认为是美共的建立者之一,由此违反了加利福尼亚anti-syndicalist 法律。她被发现有罪,判了1至14年。
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5 M; k3 U0 |, \3 N" k+ W这个案子在长时间拖延后终于在1927年到达最高法院。最高法院的判决认为anti-syndicalist 法律不违宪。Sanford地多数意见认为如果言论对公共利益有害的话,比如煽动犯罪,威胁用非法手段推翻政府,政府有权将其禁止。Louis Brandeis的concurrence虽然在技术问题上同意加利福尼亚的法律不违宪,但是在言论自由问题上,则强有力地重申clear and present danger这个原则。他尤其强调言论自由是民主社会能够正常运行的必要条件。 参与国家政治的讨论是公民的职责。而这一职责只有当他们能够自由地无顾忌地讨论批评政府的时候,才可以有效地行使。Brandeis的意见对clear and present danger的解释同Holmes在Abrams的解释相比更进一步,同后来Brandenburg v. Ohio中imminent lawless action的标准非常接近,只有当言论立刻能够导致严重暴力的时候,政府才可以禁止。只要危险不是立刻发生,而是有时间进行讨论的话,那么对付有害言论的最好方法是更多的言论,而不是政府的压制。Brandeis这一判决意见在美国法律史上非常有名,下面我将其最重要的几段摘抄下来。
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Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law -- the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.
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Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. Every denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to increase the probability that there will be violation of it. Condonation of a breach enhances the probability. Expressions of approval add to the probability. Propagation of the criminal state of mind by teaching syndicalism increases it. Advocacy of law-breaking heightens it still further. But even advocacy of violation, however, reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls sort of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and incitement, between preparation and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind. In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.' Q: f* n ^! [4 O1 m( j% d3 L
, e4 X6 Q) S+ J6 s: J% A- \If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled with freedom. Such, in my opinion, is the command of the Constitution. It is therefore always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging free speech and assembly by showing that there was no emergency justifying it.7 ?; m0 l) c7 b8 B1 \5 Q( h
+ |: R- X( F- ~1 M- S/ eMoreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions essential to effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious. Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to society. A police measure may be unconstitutional merely because the remedy, although effective as means of protection, is unduly harsh or oppressive. Thus, a State might, in the exercise of its police power, make any trespass upon the land of another a crime, regardless of the results or of the intent or purpose of the trespasser. It might, also, punish an attempt, a conspiracy, or an incitement to commit the trespass. But it is hardly conceivable that this Court would hold constitutional a statute which punished as a felony the mere voluntary assembly with a society formed to teach that pedestrians had the moral right to cross unenclosed, unposted, waste lands and to advocate their doing so, even if there was imminent danger that advocacy would lead to a trespass. The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the State. Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly.
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(Anita Whitney后来被加利福尼亚州长C. C. Young赦免,并没有坐牢。她还两次作为美国共产党候选人竞选参议员。)
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1931年的Stromberg v. California则是同禁止悬挂红旗的法律有关。Yetta Stromberg是加利福尼亚一个夏令营的老师,到这个夏令营的都是工人家庭的孩子。Stromberg当时只有19岁,是个共青团员,其他几个夏令营的工作人员也经常发表共产主义意见。保守组织Better American Federation的宗旨就是要清除共产主义等激进思想的影响,到警察局去揭发。1929年8月3日,当地的警察局对夏令营进行搜查,发现一面自制的红旗,上面还绣着镰刀和锤子,将Stromberg逮捕。在接下来的审判中,有人作证,每天早上她都和夏令营的孩子一起升红旗,向红旗、向工人阶级的自由宣誓。陪审团发现她有罪,但是最高法院以7比2判决禁止悬挂红旗的法律违反第一宪法修正案。首席法官Charles Evans Hughes虽然仍然坚持鼓吹犯罪,暴力,阴谋推翻政府的言论不受保护,但是认为加利福尼亚的法律覆盖的范围太广,其他目的悬挂红旗的行为也会被包括在内,违反了第一和第十四宪法修正案。
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Angelo Herndon是个黑人,家里很贫穷,一次在美国共产党帮助失业工人的组织拿到了一本共产党宣言,不久加入共产党。1932年,19岁的他到南方的亚特兰大,宣传共产主义,吸收新的党员,还组织1000名工人(600个白人,400个黑人)在法院门口绝食抗议,要求政府恢复对失业工人的救助 。由于共产党是当时南方很少的主张种族平等的组织,尤其遭到当地政府的惧怕。7月11日Herndon被捕,警察在他旅馆房间里搜出了一些共产主义书籍,根据19世纪内战后通过的一条法律以煽动叛乱罪对他起诉,并要求死刑。陪审团发现他有罪,判决20年。1937年最高法院以5比4判决佐治亚的这一法律违宪。按照佐治亚的法律,即使一个人没有直接要求暴力推翻政府,只要能证明这是他的意图,而且他的言论和行动能够使这更可能发生(也就是bad tendency),即便是在遥远的未来,他就犯了煽动叛乱罪。最高法院的多数意见认为这个标准太宽了,任何企图改变政府的言论都可能被网罗进去,明显违反了clear and present danger的标准。这是最高法院第一次使用clear and present danger而且发现法律没有达到这一标准。- a* q3 }) w$ U( q9 w' t, k& J
( l- [5 O/ h" o$ R, P9 J1 |5 ?总体来说,在两次世界大战之间,最高法院逐渐接受了clear and present danger的标准,但是仍然认为鼓吹犯罪、暴力的言论不受保护,按照今天的标准来看,是对言论自由不必要的限制。但是同一战时期相比,还是有很大的进步。30年代末,战争的阴云又一次开始笼罩美国,国家安全又面临威胁。下一篇我会谈一下二战时期罗斯福政府和最高法院对言论自由的态度,美国政府对日裔美国人的监禁,以及William Dudley Pelley的生平。
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