这才是唱衰

易明

　　美国智库的亚洲专家奥斯林（Michael Auslin）日前在美国主流媒体《华尔街日报》撰文，提到美国的中国专家普遍具有“中国共产党已濒临黄昏”的共识，他提醒华府关注中国的局势变化，提早思考没有中共的中国政策。


　　奥斯林在这篇〈中国共产党的黄昏〉（The Twilight of China's Communist Party）中提到，美国一位经验丰富的中国观察家在私人晚宴上对少数外国外交人员说：“我无法给你中共垮台的确切日期，但中共已进入最后阶段。”
　　文章中说，这种悲观情绪从与北京当局关系密切的人士口中流出，是非常值得注意的事情。“如果华府不想被中国的政治地震吓到，最好开始关注这件事情”。

　　奥斯林说，在场的中国专家不是保守派，也不算极少数的异议分子，他们都有广泛的经验，经常前往中国，上述的言论几乎已成为共识。

　　他认为，中共领导人习近平近来的反腐动作，已经使得权力集中到极限。但中国正面临着经济放缓，可能导致中产阶级生活品质滑落，任何潜在的大规模骚动都可能让习近平当局短路，使习面临危机。

　　从社会面来看：“中国的犬儒主义处于历史最高峰。精英分子为了家人持外国护照，财富透过房地产及其他手段转移到海外。成熟的中国经济意味着经济无论如何会放缓，但更持续的衰退将加剧仅在表层底下的紧张。”

　　如果中共将垮台，西方该怎么办？一名专家建议：跟“被边缘化”的中国人建立关系、与中国的各种声音更广泛地交流，从农民到教育工作者、到自由运动人士，这是长期唯一负责的做法。因为，“西方外交人员、学者，非政府组织与中国民众相隔太远了”。

　　那名专家问：“你上次听到华府批评中共的人权或劳动关系是什么时候？”

　　奥斯林写到，经济及安全分歧已显示出与中共有成熟合作关系的希望破灭。几十年的官方互动几乎没有改变中共领导人 。北京仍然支持北韩、伊朗之类的激进角色，而且打压自己的人民，“这个政权的本质已表露无疑”。

　　“现在是展示西方对中国的发展有道义责任的时候了。”他说：“这个结局可能还有好几年，但站在历史正确的一边，不管事件看起来多么纷乱，都是明智的作为。”




“I can’t give you a date when it will fall, but China’s Communist Party has entered its endgame.” So says one of America’s most experienced China watchers to a small table of foreign diplomats at a private dinner in Washington, D.C. The pessimism from someone with deep connections to the Chinese government is notable. Washington should start paying attention if it wishes to avoid being surprised by political earthquakes in the world’s second-largest economy.

The China scholar at my table is no conservative. Nor are the handful of other experts. Each has decades of experience, extensive ties to Chinese officials and is a regular visitor to the mainland. No one contradicts the scholar’s statement. Instead there is general agreement.

“I’ve never seen Chinese so fearful, at least not since Tiananmen,” another expert adds, referring to the 1989 massacre of pro-democracy student demonstrators in the heart of Beijing. When prodded for specifics, he mentions increased surveillance, the fear of being investigated and increased arrests.

Just as there is no dissent from these views, there is unanimity on the cause of the new atmosphere of fear: President Xi Jinping .

In just two years, Mr. Xi has become the most powerful Chinese leader since at least Deng Xiaoping, and perhaps even since Mao Zedong. Some longtime experts talk about the possibility of something approaching one-man rule in Beijing, anathema since the excesses leading up to Mao’s death in 1976. Others argue that collective leadership is alive and well, but the party is indeed tightening its grip on Chinese society.

The clearest manifestation of Mr. Xi’s power is the unprecedented crackdown on corruption. The sensational corruption and murder scandal of former Politburo star Bo Xilai in 2012-13 was just the starting point in a campaign that has also snared Zhou Yongkang, the former head of the powerful security committee and an inner member of the Standing Committee. Now the former chief of staff to ex-President Hu Jintao is also being investigated. State media report that 180,000 party officials have been “disciplined.”

While Mr. Xi clearly is attempting to restore the party’s credibility with cynical and disenchanted Chinese, he is also sending messages about his strength and the reach of the Party throughout Chinese society. Faced with an economic slowdown that may impact the living standards of the middle class, Mr. Xi is short-circuiting any potential large-scale unrest. More worrisome, he may be gathering unprecedented power—but perhaps it is more the flaring of a candle before it gutters.

If the party really is in its endgame, then neither Mr. Xi’s dramatic anticorruption campaign nor his reform program will mean much, at least in the long run. Cynicism in China is at an all-time high. The elite hold foreign passports for their families, and wealth is being transferred offshore through real estate holdings and other means. A maturing Chinese economy means an economic slowdown in any case, but a more sustained downturn would exacerbate the tensions that remain just under the surface. Nor can one discount the possibility that the knives will come out for Mr. Xi, leading to internecine war within the party.

It is hard, if not impossible, to imagine a post-Communist China. The country’s democratic and liberal voices have been suppressed for decades, and the extent of public sympathy for their cause is ultimately unknowable. A period of increasing unrest and internal disruption would undoubtedly follow any loss of power by the Communist Party.

If all this is accurate, then what should the West do? “Get outside the Fourth Ring Road,” the first specialist says, referring to the center of government power in Beijing. Western diplomats, scholars and NGOs are too isolated from the Chinese people. Greater engagement with China’s various voices, from farmers to educators to liberal activists, is the only responsible approach for the long run.

Also build links to marginalized Chinese. “When was the last time you heard Washington criticize Beijing’s human-rights record or labor relations?” the same scholar asks. It’s time to show that the West has a moral stake in China’s development. Decades of official interaction have done little if anything to change the behavior of China’s leaders.

The West must alter its approach to China. Hopes for a mature cooperative relationship have foundered on economic and security disagreements. Beijing’s support for aggressive actors like North Korea and Iran, and its repression of its own people, leave no mystery about the nature of the regime.

The endgame in China may not come for years. But being on the right side of history, no matter how messy it turns out, is the wise play.

Mr. Auslin is a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. and a columnist for WSJ.com.

易明

有意思的事，他们也要下基层了，走出四环路，联系群众，动员群众，组织群众，发动群众。

一身轻松

有意思，这个老兄似乎丝毫没有注意到网络上的“自干五”现象。在共党严厉清除自身腐败分子的前提下，自干五们保证了共党在国内民众的基层中仍有一定的支持者来维持舆论的平衡。

难道他真的以为现在的主流中国人忘了25年前的事情么，连90后都知道到了必要时候党国是敢于来真的

莳萝

我真想呵呵了，就算中国现在还有世家，但是世家的权利已经和古代不可同日而语了。毛泽东让中国人相信没有不流血的革命，没有不动荡的变革，在现今中国的大社会环境下，有多少人是过不下去愿意当炮灰搏一个前程的？如果真如他们估计，占中就应该是燎原的星星之火，可实际上呢，大陆人看占中就是在看一出不成功的荒诞剧。

晨枫

American Enterprise Institute，哈哈，他要不这么说，我倒要奇怪了。好玩，他说到西方太不了解中国人。看来他玩打正着，他对中国和中国人一点也不了解。他似乎根本没有想到过一个可能性：习的反腐和权力集中不是来自于个人营造，而是来自于党内共识。

玩牌也

把這句話放在最後一段，“The endgame in China may not come for years”，說好聽點就是這傢伙在買保險，難聽點就是他沒種！

大卫

这不科学啊，不是说章同志早就暴露了麽……

tnq

美国的反忽悠！