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How the coronavirus pandemic exposed the dark side of Western democracy
Last month, The Economist argued against engaging in a cold war with China, but concluded by revisiting a Cold War truism, claiming: “America and its allies must prepare for a far longer contest between open societies and China’s state capitalism.”
That line sits uncomfortably beside an emerging genre of writing about the demise of democracy in the post-pandemic West. Among others, The Washington Post and The Atlantic have published multiple essays about rampant inequality, the opioid crisis and nationwide protests in the United States. The use of military force against peaceful protesters and their illegal abduction shocked even members of President Donald Trump’s own party. But for many,
the mismanagement of the coronavirus pandemic
and the
needless loss of life
offered proof positive that the US is no longer the world’s flagship democracy.
Pankaj Mishra, writing in the London Review of Books, described the ripple effects of Britain’s economic policy on the country’s pandemic response.
“Over the last decade, successive conservative governments have ruthlessly shredded what was left of the social safety net in the name of budgetary ‘austerity’, hastening Britain’s decline into a flailing – if not failed – state that can’t even secure supplies of gowns and masks for its hospital workers,” he wrote.
Former British prime minister Gordon Brown, writing in The Guardian, recognised austerity and deregulation as familiar components of pre-pandemic policy in Britain and the US. He wrote that “Tory austerity was never a good idea and is now an admitted failure” – except that it remains standard doctrine for the ruling party of the US.
Mishra contrasted the negligence of flagship democracies with more responsible efforts by nations willing to implement statist intervention policies in both the East and the West. Mishra’s review of modern history suggests in fact that “East and West” no longer suffice when characterising the divide between those who do and those who do not promote the people’s “safety and happiness”.
冠状病毒大流行如何暴露了西方民主的阴暗面
上个月，《经济学人》曾反对与中国进行冷战，但最后以重新审视冷战真理为由，声称：“美国及其盟友必须为开放社会与中国国家资本主义之间的更长时间竞争做准备。”
在有关大流行后西方民主的消亡的新兴文学体裁旁边，这句话令人不安。其中，《华盛顿邮报》和《大西洋》发表了多篇有关不平等现象猖,、阿片类药物危机和美国全国性抗议活动的文章。对和平示威者使用武力及其非法绑架事件甚至震惊了唐纳德·特朗普总统自己政党的成员。但是对于许多人来说
冠状病毒大流行的管理不善和不必要的生命损失，证明美国不再是世界的旗舰民主国家。
潘卡·米什拉（Pankaj Mishra）在《伦敦书评》上写道，描述了英国经济政策对英国大流行反应的连锁反应。
“在过去的十年中，历届保守派政府以预算紧缩的名义残酷地粉碎了社会安全网的剩余部分，加速了英国的衰落-即使没有失败，它也陷入了蓬勃发展的状态，甚至无法获得礼服的供应。并为医院的工作人员戴口罩。”他写道。
英国前首相戈登·布朗（Gordon Brown）在《卫报》上撰文，承认紧缩政策和放松管制是英美两国大流行前政策的常见组成部分。他写道：“托里紧缩政策从来都不是一个好主意，现在是公认的失败”，只是它仍然是美国执政党的标准原则。
米什拉将旗舰民主制的疏忽与愿意在东方和西方实施国家主义干预政策的国家做出的更负责任的努力进行了对比。米斯拉（Mishra）对现代历史的回顾表明，事实上，在描述那些提倡和不提倡人民“安全与幸福”的人之间的鸿沟时，“东西方”已不再足够。
Had China embraced this Western vision of democracy, for instance, its coronavirus death toll would be closer to 800,000, and no doubt China would be censured for that. Instead of bringing millions of poor into the middle class, as it has, China would have condemned millions of middle-class citizens to poverty, as in the US.
What about rule of law? Foreign Affairs, The Guardian and The Atlantic have all detailed the systematic dismantling of science, expertise and rule of law during Trump’s presidency. Contempt for facts, the methodical use of disinformation and open defiance of international law are now recognised as standard right-wing tactics for governing by chaos.
A Lowy Institute report reviewing such trends concluded that “the concept of a rules-based international order has been stripped of meaning, while liberalism faces its greatest crisis in decades”.
If these writers and many more are correct that Western “democracies” have trashed core components of democracy, it is only fair to ask what Western statesmen mean when they castigate others for failing to adopt democracy.
Democracy used to demand respect for rule of law, which requires respect for facts and expertise, and a willingness to negotiate and compromise for the public benefit. For Trump administration politicians, “democracy” appears to mean:
• Austerity measures at home and abroad, with tax breaks for the wealthy and cuts to social spending
• Contempt for rules, science and expertise, as seen among climate deniers, anti-maskers and anti-vaxxers
• Groupthink, bombast and chaos as tools of governance
• An unbending refusal to compromise with the rival party, even at the expense of citizens’ lives
Conn M. Hallinan, writing at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, described how austerity measures generate “debt traps”.
“Countries cut back on public spending, which depresses their economies and increases debt, which leads to yet more rounds of borrowing and austerity,” he wrote.
This makes poor nations dependent on wealthy nations, and poor citizens dependent on wealthy citizens in a process more akin to aristocracy than to democracy. How did policies so harmful to the average citizen come to be conflated with democracy? A little history might help.
如果中国接受了西方的民主视野，其冠状病毒死亡人数将接近80万人，毫无疑问，中国将为此受到谴责。中国不会像美国那样，将数百万的贫困人口带入中产阶级，而是将数百万的中产阶级公民谴责为贫困。
法治呢？外交事务，《卫报》和《大西洋》都详细介绍了在特朗普担任总统期间系统地拆除科学，专业知识和法治的情况。蔑视事实，有条不紊地使用虚假信息和公然蔑视国际法，现已被认为是混乱治理的标准右翼策略。
Lowy Institute的报告回顾了这种趋势，得出的结论是：“基于规则的国际秩序的概念已被剥夺了意义，而自由主义则面临着数十年来最大的危机”。
如果这些作家以及更多作家正确地认为西方的“民主国家”已经破坏了民主的核心组成部分，那么公平地问西方政治家在谴责其他人没有采纳民主制度时指的是什么意思。
民主曾经要求尊重法治，这要求尊重事实和专业知识，并愿意为公共利益进行谈判和妥协。对于特朗普政府的政客来说，“民主”似乎意味着：
•国内外的紧缩措施，为富人减税并削减社会支出
•鄙视规则，科学和专业知识，如气候否认者，反掩盖者和反疫苗者中所见
•集体思考，轰炸和混乱是治理的工具
•坚决拒绝与对方妥协，即使以牺牲公民生命为代价
Conn M. Hallinan在华盛顿政策研究所发表文章，描述了紧缩措施如何产生“债务陷阱”。
他写道：“国家削减公共开支，这压低了他们的经济并增加了债务，这导致了更多的借贷和紧缩政策。”
这使得贫穷国家更加依赖富裕国家，贫穷公民更加依赖富裕国家，这一过程更类似于贵族而不是民主。对普通公民如此有害的政策如何与民主混为一谈？一段历史可能会有所帮助。
We all learned as children that democracy began in ancient Greece. Thomas Jefferson disagreed: “The government of Athens was that [of] the people of one city making laws for the whole country subjected to them … These are not the doctrines of the present age. The equal rights of man, and the happiness of every individual, are now acknowledged to be the only legitimate objects of government.”
Equal rights and the happiness of the people were unknown to the Greeks. In Politics, Aristotle observed that only aristocrats were rational, and so it was their duty to rule over merchants, craftsmen, farmers and anyone who wasn’t noble. From Thomas Aquinas through to Samuel Pufendorf and beyond, that principle was cited throughout European history. It was used to justify slavery, as well as the colonisation and subjugation of peoples all over the world, including those in Hong Kong.
Austerity measures were natural to this tradition because, apart from sporadic charity, the aristocracy could not be expected to spend money on commoners. Trickle-up economics was also part of the package. Being endowed with more “honour and property”, Aristotle felt aristocrats deserved more “liberty” than the masses.
From this short history lesson, we can see that Trump’s “democracy” shares a lot with premodern aristocracy. But how did this unmerciful tradition morph into Jefferson’s “equal rights” and the people’s happiness? Short answer: it didn’t.
Long before Montesquieu, Voltaire or Rousseau could even read, collections of Confucian texts in translation introduced the idea that the people’s happiness was the true test of legitimate government. The same writings assumed all people were rational and so any qualified man could serve in office, not just the wealthy or noble. These egalitarian ideals were repeated approvingly by influential figures throughout the Enlightenment.
我们都从小就知道民主始于古希腊。托马斯·杰斐逊（Thomas Jefferson）不同意：“雅典政府是一个城市的人民为整个国家制定法律而服从…………这不是当今时代的学说。人们公认，人的平等权利和每个人的幸福是政府的唯一合法对象。”
希腊人不知道平等的权利和人民的幸福。亚里士多德在《政治》杂志中指出，只有贵族才是理性的，因此统治商人，手工业者，农民和任何不高尚的人是他们的责任。从托马斯·阿奎那（Thomas Aquinas）到塞缪尔·普芬多夫（Samuel Pufendorf）等，整个欧洲历史都引用了这一原则。它被用来为奴隶制以及全世界人民（包括香港人民）的殖民和征服辩护。
紧缩措施对于这种传统是很自然的，因为除了零星的慈善事业之外，贵族不能指望花钱买平民。 ckle脚的经济学也是一揽子计划的一部分。亚里士多德（Aristotle）被赋予了更多的“荣誉和财产”，感到贵族应享有比群众更多的“自由”。
从这段简短的历史教训中，我们可以看到特朗普的“民主”与前现代贵族有很多共同之处。但是，这种卑鄙的传统如何演变成杰斐逊的“平等权利”和人民的幸福呢？简短的回答：没有。
孟德斯鸠，伏尔泰或卢梭甚至还没读懂之前，儒家翻译著作集就提出了这样一种思想，即人民的幸福是对合法政府的真正考验。相同的著作假设所有人都是理性的，因此任何有资格的人都可以在职，而不仅仅是富人或贵族。在启蒙运动中，有影响力的人物反复重申了这些均等的理想。
In the 1730s and 1760s, the French writer Silhouette explained how China’s government sought to stimulate industry and commerce through policies such as merit-based recruitment, channels for popular feedback, progressive taxes and government aid for the vulnerable – which we now call statist intervention policies, like the ones needed to control a worldwide pandemic.
This model could not have been more different from the Western tradition of group-ranked privilege but progressives such as Voltaire, Rousseau, Paine and Jefferson ran with it. By the late 18th century, merit-based appointment in service of the people was a standard feature of Enlightenment thought.
It should be clear that, even in the West, the history of liberal thought cannot be neatly divided along East/West fault lines. The same is true of the post-pandemic era, meaning that no single national group has all the answers.
Several authors writing in the “failure of democracy” genre, including Mishra, appreciate full well the dark side of current Chinese policy – no contest – but they also appreciate the dark side of US and British policy. In the end we will need to put aside the Star Wars plot line and recognise it is no longer reasonable to claim that one ideology always generates good outcomes while all others lead to misery and death.
One advantage of policy is that it can be shared across national and ideological divides. US presidential challenger Joe Biden’s plan to fight the pandemic – masks, testing, tracing and isolating the infected – sounds remarkably like methods pioneered in China. Does that mean Americans can’t benefit from it? Right-wing austerity revives the customs of Western aristocracies. Does that mean Americans should embrace it? Groupthink leads to irrational outcomes.
A 13th-century Chinese imperial handbook advised that, when making policy changes, one should “consider whether those changes are beneficial for the people”. If they only benefit corrupt officials, it adds, the results could be chaos. That sentiment offers sound advice for East and West, past and present. In the post-pandemic world, pragmatic policy counts more than ideology or national origin. ■
Martin Powers has written three books on the history of social justice in China, two of which won the Levenson Prize for best book in pre-1900 Chinese Studies. His most recent book published by Routledge traces the impact of Chinese texts on Enlightenment thought. He is currently professor emeritus at the University of Michigan.
在1730年代和1760年代，法国作家Silhouette解释了中国政府如何通过诸如择优录用，大众反馈渠道，累进税收和对弱势群体的政府援助等政策来刺激工商业-我们现在将其称为统计干预政策，例如控制全球流行病所需的措施。
这种模式与西方传统的团体特权制没有什么不同，但是像伏尔泰，卢梭，潘恩和杰斐逊这样的进步主义者都对此予以认同。到18世纪末，基于功绩的任命为人民服务是启蒙思想的标准特征。
应该清楚的是，即使在西方，自由主义思想的历史也不能沿着东西方的断层线整齐地划分。大流行后时代的情况也是如此，这意味着没有一个民族能够得到所有答案。
包括米斯拉（Mishra）在内的几位以“民主失败”类型撰写的作家都充分理解了当前中国政策的阴暗面-毫无争议-但他们也赞赏美国和英国政策的阴暗面。最后，我们将需要搁置《星球大战》的情节线，并认识到宣称一种意识形态总是产生好的结果而所有其他意识形态都会导致痛苦和死亡已经不再合理。
政策的优势之一是可以在国家和意识形态鸿沟之间共享。美国总统挑战者乔·拜登（Joe Biden）的抗击流感大流行的计划-掩盖，测试，追踪和隔离受感染者-听起来很像中国开创的方法。这是否意味着美国人无法从中受益？右翼紧缩政策复兴了西方贵族的习俗。这是否意味着美国人应该接受它？集体思维导致不合理的结果。
一本十三世纪的中国皇朝手册建议，在进行政策变更时，应“考虑这些变更是否对人民有利”。它补充说，如果他们只使腐败官员受益，那么结果可能是混乱的。这种情绪为过去和现在的东西方提供了合理的建议。在大流行后的世界中，务实政策比意识形态或民族血统更为重要。 ■
马丁·鲍尔斯（Martin Powers）写了三本有关中国社会正义史的书，其中两本获得了1900年前中国研究最好的莱文森奖。 Routledge出版的最新著作追溯了中文文本对启蒙思想的影响。他目前是密歇根大学名誉教授。
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/p ... e-western-democracy
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《南华早报》这篇文章有意思 。看来新冠之后，对民主制度的普适性甚至民主到底意味着什么开始在西方有质疑了。
文章有意思，全文翻译太辛苦，偷懒了，直接用谷歌翻译机翻了。将就着看吧。 |
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发表于 2020-10-5 02:06:03
