TA的每日心情 | 奋斗
2024-12-14 20:50 |
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本帖最后由 holycow 于 2019-3-17 16:20 编辑
( S! q9 R1 {6 B. ~" _( e- }( b2 b晨枫 发表于 2019-3-17 11:18. I# o* M. N# W4 C6 j
哇！好多信息是已知的，但这个上报0.6度实际2.5度太离谱了，这上法庭的时候，根本毫无辩解余地啊！
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还好 ...
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Thoughts on Seattle Times article published Sunday morning Seattle time
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$ S+ l4 n1 u+ ^3 mThis article is generally well written and seems quite accurate. One point of clarification is that early on in the 737MAX development it was thought that MCAS would only be needed at particularly high Mach numbers. For those conditions the prediction was that the original 0.6 degrees of MCAS stabilizer authority would be sufficient. That proved to be pretty close to the case during flight testing and the final MCAS increment size for cruise and higher Mach numbers is very close to 0.6 deg. Later on it was determined that MCAS would also be needed at lower Mach numbers. With that extension of MCAS came the MCAS authority vs. Mach number schedule that is in the current design. The high Mach end of that schedule is approximately 0.6 degrees. Only with Mach Number less than 0.4 is the MCAS authority 2.5 degrees. The larger authority at lower Mach numbers is needed as the effectiveness of the horizontal stabilizer is less at lower speed. It is quite common that flight control functions are given higher authority at lower airspeed and less authority at airspeed increases.
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2 P" [% U2 g7 z5 k7 {3 `4 g1. 这个解释了scope creep的一部分原因
1 k$ x% t4 i. G6 R" O3 R) O2. 解释了包子那本看起来自相矛盾的波音手册是怎么来的：一部分是改变以前的文字，一部分是更改以后的说明2 b: v8 @0 I% e0 ?, d5 Y
3. Now if part of the fix is to limit stab trim, what about low mach scenario where that degree of trim was considered necessary? |
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雷达卡
楼主
显身卡
发表于 2019-3-18 00:37:44
既然波音可以自己替自己安全检查，那要FAA干什么呢
