Thoughts on Seattle Times article published Sunday morning Seattle time . T# r$ a' O- Z; K$ R! y* O9 }4 R' \( a/ W# d
This article is generally well written and seems quite accurate. One point of clarification is that early on in the 737MAX development it was thought that MCAS would only be needed at particularly high Mach numbers. For those conditions the prediction was that the original 0.6 degrees of MCAS stabilizer authority would be sufficient. That proved to be pretty close to the case during flight testing and the final MCAS increment size for cruise and higher Mach numbers is very close to 0.6 deg. Later on it was determined that MCAS would also be needed at lower Mach numbers. With that extension of MCAS came the MCAS authority vs. Mach number schedule that is in the current design. The high Mach end of that schedule is approximately 0.6 degrees. Only with Mach Number less than 0.4 is the MCAS authority 2.5 degrees. The larger authority at lower Mach numbers is needed as the effectiveness of the horizontal stabilizer is less at lower speed. It is quite common that flight control functions are given higher authority at lower airspeed and less authority at airspeed increases.
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1. 这个解释了scope creep的一部分原因 ) @) }2 ]; i' S, S2. 解释了包子那本看起来自相矛盾的波音手册是怎么来的：一部分是改变以前的文字，一部分是更改以后的说明 & \9 L7 z; ~7 O0 `3. Now if part of the fix is to limit stab trim, what about low mach scenario where that degree of trim was considered necessary?
But as the engineering effort and flight tests progressed, according to industry and FAA officials familiar with the process, the Boeing team saw the same feature as a potentially important safety net for a different hazard highlighted in previous crashes: lower-altitude stalls in which startled pilots mistakenly pulled back on the controls and sometimes crashed aircraft. FAA officials also recognized the potential benefits and approved the system as part of the overall MAX approval.
雷达卡
楼主
显身卡
发表于 2019-3-18 00:37:44
既然波音可以自己替自己安全检查，那要FAA干什么呢
