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Donald Trump is kicking out Chinese firms and keeping their tech In a factory in Dallas, Texas, an American flag hangs from the ceiling. Beneath it some 1,200 workers and state-of-the-art robots churn out 20,000 solar panels a day, nearly a tenth of America’s total output. The location has a capacity of 5GW , meaning it makes enough solar modules each year to power 1m American homes. “Never bet against the United States’s engineering and innovation,” effuses Russell Gold, a senior executive at T1 Energy. But the facility was not always so star-spangled. Trina Solar, a Chinese giant, built the plant in 2024, before selling up just days after it entered operation. 在德克萨斯州达拉斯的 一家 工厂里 ，一面美国国旗悬挂在天花板上。国旗下方，约 1200 名工人和最先进的机器人每天生产 2 万块太阳能电池板，几乎占美国总产量的十分之一。该工厂的产能为 5 吉瓦 ，这意味着它每年生产的太阳能组件足以满足 100 万美国家庭的用电需求。“永远不要低估美国的工程技术和创新能力，”1 Energy 公司 的高级主管罗素·戈尔德热情洋溢地说道。但这家工厂并非一直如此星光熠熠。中国能源巨头天合光能于 2024 年建造了这座工厂，但在投产几天后就将其出售。 --- All over America, Chinese firms are divesting clean-energy assets at fire-sale prices: since 2025 almost $9bn of Chinese renewables investment in America has been cancelled, paused or sold to local investors, up from none in 2022 and 2023 (see chart). 在美国各地，中国企业正以极低的价格剥离清洁能源资产：自 2025 年以来，近 90 亿美元的中国在美可再生能源投资已被取消、暂停或出售给当地投资者，而 2022 年和 2023 年则没有此类投资（见图表）。 Some assets have traded at discounts of as much as 40%, according to a buyer. The sell-off has been triggered by a little-noticed change in America’s tax law last year meant to purge Chinese influence from the clean-energy sector. 据一位买家透露，部分资产的交易价格已折让高达40%。此次抛售潮是由美国去年一项鲜为人知的税法修改引发的，该修改旨在清除中国对清洁能源领域的影响力。 American investors are enjoying a windfall as they snap up assets from industry leaders. Whether a series of complicated and opaque transactions will reduce the country’s dependence on China is another matter. 美国投资者正通过收购行业领军企业的资产而获利颇丰。然而，一系列复杂且不透明的交易能否降低美国对中国的依赖，则是另一回事。 --- ![]() Chart: The Economist 图表来源：《经济学人》 --- America’s clean-energy sector had been becoming increasingly Chinese, even as relations between the two countries soured. From 2022 to 2024, Chinese firmscommitted $15.5bn to green-energy projects, nine times as much as in the previous four years. 尽管中美关系恶化，但美国的清洁能源行业却越来越依赖中国企业。2022 年至 2024 年， 中国企业对绿色能源项目的投资额达到 155 亿美元，是前四年的九倍。 Foreign markets offered Chinese producers respite from brutal, profitless competition at home; America was particularly appealing owing to generous subsidies for battery and solar assets introduced by the Biden administration. 国外市场为中国生产商提供了摆脱国内残酷无利可图的竞争的喘息之机；由于拜登政府对电池和太阳能资产推出了慷慨的补贴，美国尤其具有吸引力。 They helped drive annual solar-module production capacity in America up by half, to 65GW last year. China-linked producers accounted for about 25GW of the total. 去年，它们帮助美国太阳能组件年产能提高了一半，达到 65 吉瓦 。其中，与中国相关的生产商约占 25 吉瓦 。 --- --- Now all that is at risk. The change in the law was initiated by Donald Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act. Since it was passed in July, firms with connections to China have been banned from accessing government subsidies. 现在这一切都岌岌可危。这项法律的改变源于唐纳德·特朗普的《一项宏伟法案》（One Big Beautiful Bill Act）。自 7 月通过以来，与中国有关联的公司已被禁止获得政府补贴。 One of the affected programmes, called Section 45X, reduces a firm’s tax bill by seven cents for every solar-module watt and $35 for every battery-cell kilowatt-hour it makes. 受影响的计划之一，即第 45X 条款，规定每生产 1 瓦太阳能组件，公司可减免 7 美分的税款；每生产 1 千瓦时电池，公司可减免 35 美元的税款。 For a 5GW solar-manufacturing facility, like the one Trina Solar built in Dallas, the handout could amount to $350m a year. According to Rhodium Group, a research firm, more than half of Chinese clean-energy investments since 2022 have been canceled, paused or delayed. 对于像天合光能（Trina Solar）在达拉斯建造的那种 5 吉瓦 太阳能制造厂来说，这笔补贴每年可能高达 3.5 亿美元。据研究公司荣鼎集团（Rhodium Group）称，自 2022 年以来，中国超过一半的清洁能源投资项目已被取消、暂停或推迟。 --- Chinese operators that have already built solar and battery assets have been identified as “Foreign Entities of Concern” ( FEOC ), alongside those from Iran, North Korea and Russia. Regulators have taken a strict interpretation of the FEOC rule, says Herbert Crowther of Eurasia Group, a consultancy. 已建成太阳能和储能资产的中国运营商与来自伊朗、朝鲜和俄罗斯的运营商一起被列为“受关注的外国实体”（ FEOC ）。欧亚集团咨询公司的赫伯特·克劳瑟表示，监管机构对 FEOC 规则采取了严格的解读。 A Chinese entity can have no more than a 25% stake in a factory, the facility must not rely on licensed Chinese technology and it must buy less than 50% of the value of its inputs from Chinese suppliers—a figure that will fall to 15% in 2030. 中国实体在工厂的持股比例不得超过 25%，工厂不得依赖中国授权技术，且从中国供应商处购买的投入品价值不得超过其总价值的 50%——到 2030 年，这一比例将降至 15%。 --- The restrictions are a hammer blow to Chinese investors. In a filing to the Shanghai Stock Exchange in April, Boway, a Chinese industrial firm, said that its solar-module factory in North Carolina had become unprofitable after the withdrawal of government money. 这些限制措施对中国投资者来说无疑是沉重打击。中国工业企业博威（Boway）在 4 月份提交给上海证券交易所的文件中表示，由于政府资金撤回，其位于北卡罗来纳州的太阳能组件工厂已陷入亏损。 Even for those that can afford to operate without tax credits, competing against subsidised domestic suppliers is a losing battle, as Western firms in China have learned to their cost. 即使对于那些有能力在没有税收抵免的情况下运营的企业来说，与获得补贴的国内供应商竞争也是一场必败之战，在华西方企业已经为此付出了惨痛的代价。 Lingering uncertainty about whether producers, even after big restructurings, will be able to satisfy American authorities has led some solar installers, banks and insurers to pause doing business with manufacturers out of concern that their tax credits will never arrive. 由于人们仍然不确定，即使经过大规模重组，生产商是否能够满足美国当局的要求，一些太阳能安装商、银行和保险公司担心税收抵免永远不会到账，因此暂停与制造商开展业务。 Indeed, American authorities are said to have expected, and hoped, Chinese producers would leave the market altogether before introducing the new rules. 事实上，据说美国当局曾预期并希望中国生产商在新规出台前完全退出市场。 --- --- As a consequence of the legal changes, billions of dollars in assets, technology and know-how are being transferred to American investors. Corning, an American firm, picked up a 2GW solar-module factory in Arizona for an undisclosed sum last year. Boway offloaded its newly built 3GW factory in North Carolina for $254m in May, almost 15% less than it cost to build. The assembly lines left by retreating firms are full of Chinese technology, intended to assemble Chinese-designed solar panels with Chinese-made inputs. 由于法律变更，价值数十亿美元的资产、技术和专有技术正被转移到美国投资者手中。美国公司康宁去年以未公开的价格收购了位于亚利桑那州的一家 2 吉瓦 太阳能组件工厂。博威公司于今年 5 月以 2.54 亿美元的价格出售了其位于北卡罗来纳州新建的 3 吉瓦 工厂，售价比建设成本低了近 15%。撤离公司留下的装配线充斥着中国技术，这些装配线旨在组装中国设计、中国制造的太阳能电池板。 Other firms want to keep their foothold in the American market and find ways to hang on to the tax credits. 其他公司希望保住在美国市场的地位，并想方设法保留税收抵免。 They are creating joint ventures with local partners, says Mona Dajani, who leads energy transactions at Cooley, a law firm. 库利律师事务所负责能源交易的莫娜·达贾尼表示，他们正在与当地合作伙伴创建合资企业。 --- Joint ventures can improve the competitiveness of local industry by sharing technology and know-how, as China learned in the 1990s and 2000s. This time, however, there will be fewer spillover benefits, since many ventures appear superficial. 合资企业可以通过共享技术和诀窍来提高当地产业的竞争力，正如中国在上世纪90年代和本世纪初所学到的那样。然而，这一次的溢出效应将会减少，因为许多合资企业看起来流于表面。 At least one transaction exists more on paper than on the factory floor: Canadian Solar shifted its American assets from a Chinese subsidiary back to its Canadian parent by, in effect, creating a joint venture with itself. 至少有一笔交易更多地停留在纸面上，而不是实际生产车间：加拿大太阳能公司将其美国资产从中国子公司转移回其加拿大母公司，实际上就是与自己成立了一家合资企业。 “The goal is compliance, not integration,” says Ms Dajani. “目标是合规，而不是融合，”达贾尼女士说。 --- In part, that is because the activities of Chinese firms abroad are being watched ever more closely by authorities at home. America has forced sales of high-profile Chinese assets, including TikTok, a video app, and ports on the Panama Canal. 部分原因是，中国企业在海外的活动正受到国内当局日益密切的监控。美国已强制中国出售一些备受瞩目的资产，包括短视频应用 TikTok 和巴拿马运河的港口。 New rules passed by China’s cabinet to protect its investments abroad will take effect on July 1st. They include clamping down on technology exports. The measures also promise retaliation against “discriminatory measures” taken by foreign governments. 中国国务院通过的旨在保护其海外投资的新规将于7月1日生效。这些新规包括限制技术出口，并承诺对外国政府采取的“歧视性措施”进行报复。 Nancy Sun, a lawyer in Shanghai, says the rules “encourage the Chinese company to say ‘no’”. 上海律师孙南希表示，这些规定“鼓励中国公司说‘不’”。 --- American clean-tech firms worry that merging with a Chinese partner will invite the ire of the Trump administration. Chinese firms want to avoid handing their tech to competitors. So the assets are chiefly being bought by financial investors, not clean-tech manufacturers. 美国清洁技术公司担心与中国伙伴合并会招致特朗普政府的不满。中国公司则希望避免将技术拱手让给竞争对手。因此，这些资产主要被金融投资者而非清洁技术制造商收购。 For instance, Jinko Solar sold 75% of its 2GW solar facility in Jacksonville, Florida, to fh Capital, an American investor. “There is a marriage of convenience where the us partners get a majority of the financial upside, but the Chinese partner is de facto delivering the operational competency,” says Mr Crowther. 例如，晶科能源将其位于佛罗里达州杰克逊维尔的 2 吉瓦 太阳能电站 75%的股份出售给了美国投资者 fh Capital。“这是一种权宜之计的联姻， 美国 合作伙伴获得了大部分财务收益，但实际上运营能力是由中国合作伙伴提供的，”克劳瑟先生说道。 --- Disentangling from Chinese supply chains is difficult in any industry. In clean technology, China is just about inescapable. It makes 95% of the world’s polysilicon, the main input to solar panels. Investors The Economist spoke with refused to say where their inputs would now come from: the ability to source scarce non-Chinese materials is a commercial advantage. Others have come up with work-arounds to limit their links to China. 在任何行业，摆脱对中国供应链的依赖都十分困难。在清洁技术领域，中国几乎无处不在。全球 95%的多晶硅都产自中国，而多晶硅是太阳能电池板的主要原材料。 《经济学人》 采访的投资者拒绝透露他们未来的原材料来源：能够采购到稀缺的非中国原材料是一项商业优势。其他一些企业则想方设法规避与中国的联系。 Trina Solar, for example, sold its intellectual property to a Singaporean firm so that T1 Energy could license it. 例如，天合光能将其知识产权出售给一家新加坡公司，以便 T1 Energy 可以授权使用该知识产权。 --- Mr Trump’s legislation sought to scupper the green-energy boom. Instead, it may end up shaping a new generation of American green-tech investment. Mr Gold’s firm is building a factory in Austin for solar cells to be used in modules made down the road, in Dallas. fh Capital plans to double capacity at its Jacksonville facility and begin making batteries, too. The industry is rebranding itself as “non-woke”, in an attempt to divert the Trump administration’s hostility towards clean energy. 特朗普的立法原本意在扼杀绿色能源的繁荣。然而，它最终可能反而会塑造新一代美国绿色科技投资格局。戈尔德先生的公司正在奥斯汀建造一座太阳能电池工厂，这些电池将用于未来在达拉斯生产的组件。fh Capital 计划将其位于杰克逊维尔的工厂产能翻番，并开始生产电池。为了转移特朗普政府对清洁能源的敌意，该行业正在重新定位自己，标榜自己“非觉醒”。 --- In fact, the industry is increasingly invoking America’s competition with China in an attempt to extract support from the government. Saudi Arabia was once the largest oil producer, and Russia used to supply most of the world’s natural gas, muses Mr Gold. 事实上，该行业越来越多地援引美国与中国的竞争来试图从政府那里获得支持。戈尔德先生沉思道，沙特阿拉伯曾经是最大的石油生产国，而俄罗斯过去供应了世界上大部分天然气。 Today America is the energy superpower. 如今，美国是能源超级大国。 Still, “China is the largest producer of solar panels,” he says. Having picked the fruits of China’s investment, America’s clean-energy industry now needs higher tariffs on imports of Chinese polysilicon, he claims. “Then we can be globally competitive.” ■ 不过，他表示，“中国仍然是全球 最大的太阳能电池板生产国”。他认为，美国的清洁能源产业已经从中国的投资中获益，现在需要对中国多晶硅进口征收更高的关税。“这样我们才能在全球范围内保持竞争力。” ■
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