As China’s military modernization progresses, the U.S. ability to confidently accomplish these missions is eroding. In the near term, China is deploying capabilities that threaten U.S.land and sea power projection platforms—air bases and aircraft carriers—as well as Taiwan’s own defenses. Absent an unlikely reversal in the ongoing rebalancing of military power in the area, and even recognizing the very considerable difficulties in mounting an amphibious assault against determined local resistance, a direct defense of Taiwan has already become a challenge and is likely to become increasingly difficult in coming years.
Growth in China’s military capabilities, particularly its naval, air, and missile power projection forces, will steadily increase the costs of dealing with a contingency of this kind.Absent a general U.S. withdrawal from the Western Pacific or a dramatic reduction in Japan’s own self-defense capabilities, however, direct defense of Japan should remain a credible—if increasingly challenging—strategy for the next twenty to thirty years.
Generally speaking, direct defense by U.S. forces as an operational option is feasible at present, though confidence in this varies from the South China Sea (high) to North Korea (medium) to Taiwan (medium-low).
Barring unforeseen technological developments that assure survivability for U.S. forces and C4ISR, it will not be possible or affordable for the United States to buck these trends. As the defense of Taiwan is already becoming problematic for U.S. forces (e.g., carriers and nearby air bases), so will U.S. operational options in the event of a confrontation with China over North Korea’s collapse and a crisis in Southeast Asia.
With the passage of time and improvement of Chinese capabilities, the United States will find itself forced to shift from deterrence by denial, based on direct defense of its interests and allies in the Western Pacific, to deterrence by punishment, based on the threat of escalation, using longer-range weapons and more survivable platforms.
The economic consequences of a Sino-American conflict could be historically unparalleled, even if both sides avoid economic warfare. This is a powerful mutual deterrent, one marginally in the U.S. favor at present. Strengthening the U.S. economy is the best way of ensuring that the balance of interdependence and of the associated deterrence does not shift dangerously against the United States over the next several decades.
While the risk of conflict with China cannot be ignored, neither should it be exaggerated. Any number of other conflicts are more likely, some in places we cannot even vaguely foresee at present, just as no one foresaw our engagement in the Balkans in 1989, our invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq on September 10, 2001, or our current commitment in Libya as recently as six months ago.
魔术师 发表于 2011-10-12 08:47 & K, X5 L* |, j- X- ~% ]( J
我觉得美国主要是不想把战争扩大。如果只是低烈度冲突,中国可能还能应付;如果真的撕破脸,中国肯定不是美 ...
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