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标题: 37天 [打印本页]

作者: 晨枫 时间: 2021-12-30 04:16
标题: 37天
本帖最后由晨枫于 2021-12-29 14:22 编辑

有看过BBC电视剧《37天》的吗？BBC的中国报导臭不可闻，但BBC的电视剧（尤其是历史剧）还是不错的，他们的艺术史节目也很赞。人老了，容易历史地看问题，不光看到问题在今天的纠葛，更看到问题在历史上的来龙去脉。国家也是一样。

这是将斐迪南大公遇刺到一战爆发的37天里，英国和德国之间在奥地利、俄罗斯、法国的推动下的外交互动。一战爆发已经是显学了，但到现在，还是非常有借鉴意义。这是各方对行动与反行动的误判、低估、盲目自信、外强中干的一锅煮。

德国是上升势力，对受到轻慢非常敏感，对自己的实力盲目自信，但又对英国很忌惮；法国是没落帝国，只剩下高傲和蛮干；奥地利已经没落了，干什么都慢一拍，而且成事不足败事有余；塞尔维亚一方面民族主义高涨，另一方面即使老迈的奥地利一发威，也立刻卑躬屈膝。

最有意思的是英国。一方面还在日不落的余晖中，各国都指望英国调停，约束另一方；另一方面英国实际上缺乏足够的威慑力和号召力，用见人说人话见鬼说鬼话来安抚各方，同时对各国期望过高暗暗叫苦。

英国国内对涉足欧洲大陆的战争的反对声很高，不愿卷入一场没有赢家的灾难。另一方面，英国置身事外有损英国的声誉，即使避免了战争的损害，也国际影响也将荡然无存，Pax Britanica轰然倒塌。

剧中外交大臣Edward Grey在对邱吉尔自问自答时说到：怎么劝说一个民主国家投入战争？就是要劝说自己将要送命的百姓投票大仗，然后在他们死后，把名字记下，弄得好像很人性化一样(How do you bring a democracy to war? You persuade those who will die to vote for it. Then we record their names and make it look personal。不一定是原话，大意如此）。

我没有看过《是大臣》或者《是首相》，但估计这个《37天》在刻画外交和列强思维方面，至少不逊于那两个经典。

英国人看这个是回顾不堪回首的往事，其实美国人才应该多看看。太符合美国现实了。

剧中德国首相霍尔维格在召集议会党团首脑会议，劝说他们赞同发放战争债券。势力很大的社会民主党人是反战的，霍尔维格本人不赞成战争，正确地预见到奥地利过于压迫塞尔维亚的话，俄罗斯会被迫卷入和总动员；德国一旦和俄罗斯打起来，法国作为盟国就必须与德国为敌；法国和德国一旦打起来，英国作为盟国也必须入场。所以霍尔维格是反对战争的。德皇威廉二世倾向战争，但只是与俄罗斯的战争。总参谋长小毛奇鼓动德国两线开战，因为只打俄罗斯的话，必须时刻防范法国在背后发难。用施里芬计划，先用90%的兵力在六周内消灭法国，然后回师东线，就能取得两线的胜利。那时英国隔着英吉利海峡，也将无所作为。

威廉二世最后被小毛奇说动了，霍尔维格照办。在被问道为什么他不鼓动社会民主党人否决战争债券以阻止战争，他说到，那样的话，“解药比疾病还要糟糕”（The cure is worse than the disease），因为社会民主党人是一帮子犹太人。

社会民主党-犹太人在一战中的作用是纳粹反犹的动力之一。犹太人“唯利是图”，不顾国家和民族利益，“邪恶的犹太人导致德国输掉了一战”，这些说法是非常蛊惑人心的，但不是纳粹发明的，而是扎根德国民族意识已久的。

在现在，跨国公司会在美国成为“新犹太人”吗？这是值得观察的问题。

作者: 海天 时间: 2021-12-30 06:17
“37天”几年前看过，挺不错的。

当时还出了一堆纪念一战爆发一百周年的书（“梦游者”什么的），这个片子好像也是赶百年纪念。

施里芬计划在西方得算个显学了，传统说法“都是小毛奇削弱右翼搞坏了”后来也受到些挑战：有说
从后勤角度原来的施里芬方案不可行；前些年还有个美国人（zuber？）出书，挖了一批档案以后，
从根儿上质疑神马叫“施里芬计划”

作者: 海天 时间: 2021-12-30 06:37
翻了一下，维基里关于zuber的书是这么说的：

Holmes–Zuber debate

Zuber wrote that the Schlieffen Memorandum was a "rough draft" of a plan to attack France in a one-front war, which could not be regarded as an operational plan, as the memo was never typed up, was stored with Schlieffen's family and envisioned the use of units not in existence. The "plan" was not published after the war, when it was being called an infallible recipe for victory, ruined by the failure of Moltke adequately to select and maintain the aim of the offensive. Zuber wrote that if Germany faced a war with France and Russia, the real Schlieffen Plan was for defensive counter-attacks.[67] Holmes supported Zuber in his analysis that Schlieffen had demonstrated in his thought-experiment and in Aufmarsch I West, that 48+1⁄2 corps (1.36 million front-line troops) was the minimum force necessary to win a decisive battle against France or to take strategically important territory. Holmes asked why Moltke attempted to achieve either objective with 34 corps (970,000 first-line troops) only 70 per cent of the minimum required.[36]

In the 1914 campaign, the retreat by the French army denied the Germans a decisive battle, leaving them to breach the "secondary fortified area" from the Région Fortifiée de Verdun (Verdun fortified zone), along the Marne to the Région Fortifiée de Paris (Paris fortified zone).[36] If this "secondary fortified area" could not be overrun in the opening campaign, the French would be able to strengthen it with field fortifications. The Germans would then have to break through the reinforced line in the opening stages of the next campaign, which would be much more costly. Holmes wrote that

Schlieffen anticipated that the French could block the German advance by forming a continuous front between Paris and Verdun. His argument in the 1905 memorandum was that the Germans could achieve a decisive result only if they were strong enough to outflank that position by marching around the western side of Paris while simultaneously pinning the enemy down all along the front. He gave precise figures for the strength required in that operation: 33+1⁄2 corps (940,000 troops), including 25 active corps (active corps were part of the standing army capable of attacking and reserve corps were reserve units mobilised when war was declared and had lower scales of equipment and less training and fitness). Moltke's army along the front from Paris to Verdun, consisted of 22 corps (620,000 combat troops), only 15 of which were active formations.

— Holmes[36]
Lack of troops made "an empty space where the Schlieffen Plan requires the right wing (of the German force) to be". In the final phase of the first campaign, the German right wing was supposed to be "outflanking that position (a line west from Verdun, along the Marne to Paris) by advancing west of Paris across the lower Seine" but in 1914 "Moltke's right wing was operating east of Paris against an enemy position connected to the capital city...he had no right wing at all in comparison with the Schlieffen Plan". Breaching a defensive line from Verdun, west along the Marne to Paris, was impossible with the forces available, something Moltke should have known.[68]

Holmes could not adequately explain this deficiency but wrote that Moltke's preference for offensive tactics was well known and thought that unlike Schlieffen, Moltke was an advocate of the strategic offensive,

Moltke subscribed to a then fashionable belief that the moral advantage of the offensive could make up for a lack of numbers on the grounds that "the stronger form of combat lies in the offensive" because it meant "striving after positive goals".

— Holmes[69]
The German offensive of 1914 failed because the French refused to fight a decisive battle and retreated to the "secondary fortified area". Some German territorial gains were reversed by the Franco-British counter-offensive against the 1st Army (Generaloberst Alexander von Kluck) and 2nd Army (Generaloberst Karl von Bülow), on the German right (western) flank, during the First Battle of the Marne (5–12 September).[70]

完整词条 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schlieffen_Plan
作者: 晨枫 时间: 2021-12-30 06:53

海天发表于 2021-12-29 16:37
翻了一下，维基里关于zuber的书是这么说的：

Holmes–Zuber debate

这样机械地比较施里芬计划和小毛奇似乎太教条主义了？
作者: 海天 时间: 2021-12-30 07:17

晨枫发表于 2021-12-29 17:53
这样机械地比较施里芬计划和小毛奇似乎太教条主义了？

也许吧......没仔细读过zuber的原著：

https://book.douban.com/subject/5363962/
作者: 井木犴 时间: 2021-12-30 07:51
"对受到轻慢非常敏感，对自己的实力盲目自信"，尼玛中国刚好相反
作者: drknight 时间: 2021-12-30 09:44

跨国公司会在美国成为“新犹太人”吗

为什么是跨国公司？新犹太人难道没有现成的人选吗
作者: 晨枫 时间: 2021-12-30 14:28

drknight 发表于 2021-12-29 19:44
为什么是跨国公司？新犹太人难道没有现成的人选吗

因为他们唯利是图、不爱国啊
作者: 海天 时间: 2021-12-31 03:42

晨枫发表于 2021-12-30 01:28
因为他们唯利是图、不爱国啊

我猜他是指华裔吧......
作者: 晨枫 时间: 2021-12-31 05:18

海天发表于 2021-12-30 13:42
我猜他是指华裔吧......

排华是可以想象的，但华裔对欧美社会的影响远不及犹太人，排华不解决社会问题，排华也凝聚不了社会，没用。
作者: 老票 时间: 2021-12-31 18:32

我没有看过《是大臣》或者《是首相》，但估计这个《37天》在刻画外交和列强思维方面，至少不逊于那两个经典。

是我记错了么？这俩不是一个电视连续剧么？里面的台词非常经典，尤其适合现在的欧美诸国，所以被无数次截图引用了。

去找找看这部37天...

BBC的纪录片也很不错的，有一部《深蓝》描写一头抹香鲸的，间接使我爱上了潜水...

作者: 晨枫 时间: 2021-12-31 22:13
本帖最后由晨枫于 2021-12-31 08:16 编辑

老票发表于 2021-12-31 04:32
是我记错了么？这俩不是一个电视连续剧么？里面的台词非常经典，尤其适合现在的欧美诸国，所以被无数次 ...

BBC在涉及中国当代政治的时候臭不可闻，在历史文化方面，包括中国历史文化，还真是不错的，考虑比较严格，阐述相当精辟，台词的文字质量很高，比美国的电视节目质量高得多。BBC是官办的，考虑收视率，但又不纠结于收视率，有点当年苏联电影的做派。

BBC的自然节目是经典了：Deep Blue很赞，更加经典的是Plant Earth。David Attenborough的Sir和一大串头衔一大半来自这几个节目。
作者: 常挨揍 时间: 2022-1-1 13:53
这三天假期就看这个了
作者: 晨枫 时间: 2022-1-1 14:53

常挨揍发表于 2021-12-31 23:53
这三天假期就看这个了

那不止。还有No time to die，Cruella，In the heights，The Crown Season 4
作者: 常挨揍 时间: 2022-1-1 20:22

晨枫发表于 2022-1-1 14:53
那不止。还有No time to die，Cruella，In the heights，The Crown Season 4

好像俺不至于被这个带偏
作者: 常挨揍 时间: 2022-1-1 20:25

晨枫发表于 2022-1-1 14:53
那不止。还有No time to die，Cruella，In the heights，The Crown Season 4

看了一下，这个黑的角度还不如黑爵士
作者: 常挨揍 时间: 2022-1-3 21:06

晨枫发表于 2022-1-1 14:53
那不止。还有No time to die，Cruella，In the heights，The Crown Season 4

是不是弱化了小毛奇不肯停下总动员硬杠的事？虽然法国那位也一样。
作者: 晨枫 时间: 2022-1-3 23:49

常挨揍发表于 2022-1-3 07:06
是不是弱化了小毛奇不肯停下总动员硬杠的事？虽然法国那位也一样。

基本上把小毛奇作为竞相总动员的罪魁祸首了
作者: MacArthur 时间: 2022-1-4 01:01

英国人看这个是回顾不堪回首的往事，其实美国人才应该多看看。太符合美国现实了

大家拿人不需要看吗？盟友生病，跟着吃药。。。

德 国是上升势力，对受到轻慢非常敏感，对自己的实力盲目自信，但又对 英 国很忌惮

就凭这句话，小粉红们就能喷你个“含沙射影，居心叵测” 没商量。。。

作者: 晨枫 时间: 2022-1-4 01:13

MacArthur 发表于 2022-1-3 11:01
大家拿人不需要看吗？盟友生病，跟着吃药。。。

加拿大人就不必看了，看了也白看。该吃药的时候，不想吃也得吃。

观网上这句话好像没有引起多少反应啊

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