油价可以跌到20刀？
前两天路透社发的某博客。我觉得20刀是不可能的。 专业人士们来说说吧。http://blogs.reuters.com/anatole-kaletsky/2014/12/19/the-reason-oil-could-drop-as-low-as-20-per-barrel/
Analysis & Opinion | Anatole Kaletsky
The reason oil could drop as low as $20 per barrel
By Anatole Kaletsky
December 19, 2014
An oil pump jack pumps oil in a field near Calgary
How low can it go — and how long will it last? The 50 percent slump in oil prices raises both those questions and while nobody can confidently answer the first question (I will try to in a moment), the second is pretty easy.
Low oil prices will last long enough for one of two events to happen. The first possibility, the one most traders and analysts seem to expect, is that Saudi Arabia will re-establish OPEC’s monopoly power once it achieves the true geopolitical or economic objectives that spurred it to trigger the slump. The second possibility, one I wrote about two weeks ago, is that the global oil market will move toward normal competitive conditions in which prices are set by the marginal production costs, rather than Saudi or OPEC monopoly power. This may seem like a far-fetched scenario, but it is more or less how the oil market worked for two decades from 1986 to 2004.
Whichever outcome finally puts a floor under prices, we can be confident that the process will take a long time to unfold. It is inconceivable that just a few months of falling prices will be enough time for the Saudis to either break the Iranian-Russian axis or reverse the growth of shale oil production in the United States. It is equally inconceivable that the oil market could quickly transition from OPEC domination to a normal competitive one. The many bullish oil investors who still expect prices to rebound quickly to their pre-slump trading range are likely to be disappointed. The best that oil bulls can hope for is that a new, and substantially lower, trading range may be established as the multi-year battles over Middle East dominance and oil-market share play out.
The key question is whether the present price of around $55 will prove closer to the floor or the ceiling of this new range. The history of inflation-adjusted oil prices, deflated by the U.S. Consumer Price Index, offers some intriguing hints. The 40 years since OPEC first flexed its muscles in 1974 can be divided into three distinct periods. From 1974 to 1985, West Texas Intermediate, the U.S. benchmark, fluctuated between $48 and $120 in today’s money. From 1986 to 2004, the price ranged from $21 to $48 (apart from two brief aberrations during the 1998 Russian crisis and the 1991 war in Iraq). And from 2005 until this year, oil has again traded in its 1974 to 1985 range of roughly $50 to $120, apart from two very brief spikes in the 2008-09 financial crisis.
What makes these three periods significant is that the trading range of the past 10 years was very similar to the 1974-85 first decade of OPEC domination, but the 19 years from 1986 to 2004 represented a totally different regime. It seems plausible that the difference between these two regimes can be explained by the breakdown of OPEC power in 1985 and the shift from monopolistic to competitive pricing for the next 20 years, followed by the restoration of monopoly pricing in 2005 as OPEC took advantage of surging Chinese demand.
In view of this history, the demarcation line between the monopolistic and competitive regimes at a little below $50 a barrel seems a reasonable estimate of where one boundary of the new long-term trading range might end up. But will $50 be a floor or a ceiling for the oil price in the years ahead?
There are several reasons to expect a new trading range as low as $20 to $50, as in the period from 1986 to 2004. Technological and environmental pressures are reducing long-term oil demand and threatening to turn much of the high-cost oil outside the Middle East into a “stranded asset” similar to the earth’s vast unwanted coal reserves. Additional pressures for low oil prices in the long term include the possible lifting of sanctions on Iran and Russia and the ending of civil wars in Iraq and Libya, which between them would release additional oil reserves bigger than Saudi Arabia’s on to the world markets.
The U.S. shale revolution is perhaps the strongest argument for a return to competitive pricing instead of the OPEC-dominated monopoly regimes of 1974-85 and 2005-14. Although shale oil is relatively costly, production can be turned on and off much more easily – and cheaply – than from conventional oilfields. This means that shale prospectors should now be the “swing producers” in global oil markets instead of the Saudis. In a truly competitive market, the Saudis and other low-cost producers would always be pumping at maximum output, while shale shuts off when demand is weak and ramps up when demand is strong. This competitive logic suggests that marginal costs of U.S. shale oil, generally estimated at $40 to $50, should in the future be a ceiling for global oil prices, not a floor.
On the other hand, there are also good arguments for OPEC-monopoly pricing of $50 to $120 to be re-established once markets test the bottom of this range. OPEC members have a strong interest in preventing a return to competitive pricing and could learn to function again as an effective cartel. Although price-fixing becomes more difficult as U.S. producers increase market share, OPEC could try to impose pricing “discipline” if it can knock out many U.S. shale producers next year. The macro-economic impact of low oil prices on global growth could help this effort by boosting economic activity and energy demand.
So which of these arguments will prove right: The bearish case for a $20 to $50 trading-range based on competitive market pricing? Or the bullish one for $50 to $120 based on resumed OPEC dominance?
Ask me again once the price of oil has fallen to $50 – and stayed there for a year or so.
PHOTO: An oil pump jack pumps oil in a field near Calgary, Alberta, July 21, 2014. Pump jacks are used to pump crude oil out of the ground after an oil well has been drilled. REUTERS/Todd Korol
咱也一回两处。
应该不可能，否则美加经济会成问题的。 老兵帅客 发表于 2014-12-20 16:06
咱也一回两处。
应该不可能，否则美加经济会成问题的。
美加经济可能已近出问题了。Bloomberg报导，油价低于70美元后，有约10000亿投资（1trillion）可能成为zombie投资，也就是说无利可图，但也无法脱身，套住了。 晨枫 发表于 2014-12-20 18:49
美加经济可能已近出问题了。Bloomberg报导，油价低于70美元后，有约10000亿投资（1trillion）可能成为zom ...
肯定啊，至少页岩油、页岩气之类的投资在油价低落以后是无利可图，甚至会亏损的。 短期可能行，长期不可能。。。俺估计过了冬天油价就会回升。 个人预测，这次油价最多下探40档，如果到20档，我肯定卖了房子抄底。 这里说的20-50区间震荡可能性的基本假定是常规石油产量可以足够满足市场需求，于是非常规石油就变成了价格调节者。那么你觉得常规石油产量能够满足石油市场需求么？
在我这里答案是不能，所以如果油价真低于$40，是抄底的时候了不必等到$20。 40美元我觉得是极限了，20美元的画我记得是90年代有一段有这个程度，但是那个时候的世界经济和现在不一样，需求总量上讲现在中美差距已经不是很大了，真要掉到20美元，那中美之间肯定要死一个导致需求严重萎靡才行。 本帖最后由 Salmon 于 2014-12-21 15:21 编辑
不爱吱声 发表于 2014-12-21 10:46
这里说的20-50区间震荡可能性的基本假定是常规石油产量可以足够满足市场需求，于是非常规石油就变成了价格 ...
油价现在的朝60方向的反弹是死猫跳，炒家押错方向了。在需求不振的情况下，供应方必须作出重大减产的决定后才可以触底，或者国际政治军事重大事件使得重要产地供应中断。在目前的供需格局没有发生重大改变的情况下，油价是奔着40去了，然后再波动上行。现在都没有人踩刹车，肯定是继续下行，一群抄底的炒家都要爆仓了。那个金融机构也没有能力影响油价的基本盘，只能是顺势而为。我自己是押了1万5千美元在继续做空DWTI，不到45美元/桶不收兵。成本108，目前95，帐面亏损12%。 Salmon 发表于 2014-12-21 15:03
油价现在的朝60方向的反弹是死猫跳，炒家押错方向了。在需求不振的情况下，供应方必须作出重大减产的决定 ...
可以持有一段时间，现在的上涨是期货交割，有大机构做升水套利。 晨枫 发表于 2014-12-21 07:49
美加经济可能已近出问题了。Bloomberg报导，油价低于70美元后，有约10000亿投资（1trillion）可能成为zom ...
我看这要看银行业对未来前景的估计了。
只要银行不逼着非常规石油业马上还贷款，只要油价还高于日常资金投入，已经建成的非常规石油企业还能维持生产，建设成本留待以后好转了再收回。看来油价继续下跌的话先停的是油沙，已建成的页岩油气抽油成本不会太高。
银行也是两难，宽限还贷期，这些已建成的非常规石油企业还能维持生产，油价回升就得拖后。把这些非常规石油企业逼垮了，石油产量下降油价就会很快回升，但企业破产贷款能收回的就少了。 鳕鱼邪恶 发表于 2014-12-21 08:01
短期可能行，长期不可能。。。俺估计过了冬天油价就会回升。
冬天正是需求大的时候，过冬之后持平吧。 糊里糊涂 发表于 2014-12-21 10:03
个人预测，这次油价最多下探40档，如果到20档，我肯定卖了房子抄底。
国内降到五块钱一升，我就去买车。 njyd 发表于 2014-12-21 06:55
我看这要看银行业对未来前景的估计了。
只要银行不逼着非常规石油业马上还贷款，只要油价还高于日常资金 ...
为什么油砂比页岩先停呢？ 油价短期跌倒五十以下的可能性不低。但是五十以下的价格维持超过一年基本不可能的。
现在非常规油占的比例不小，和八十年代中期常规油供应足够的情况是不一样的。
而且低价油时间越长，过几年油价反弹就会越厉害。
二十就更是胡说了，考虑通货膨胀，二十美元的油要到石油危机之前去找了。 隧道 发表于 2014-12-21 21:07
冬天正是需求大的时候，过冬之后持平吧。
持平到100？:lol
现在是“战争”时期，一切正常分析都不管用了~
如果最冷的时候来个大涨就好玩了。;P 要是降到20甚至只是40就应该大把购入把大庆这么多年开采的油井都填满。 就连最积极的好事者大英帝国已经开始说北海油田项目被影响，尼桑厂就业要出问题了。欧洲快苟不住了。
不明白欧洲为什么老是这么心甘情愿做冤大头。 不爱吱声 发表于 2014-12-21 10:46
这里说的20-50区间震荡可能性的基本假定是常规石油产量可以足够满足市场需求，于是非常规石油就变成了价格 ...
Conventional从2005就开始在73M/Day的区域徘徊了。
http://www.euanmearns.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/C+C_detail_jul13.png
现在全世界的需求却是在93M/Day
http://financialpostbusiness.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/fp1212_oil_demand_c_ab.jpeg?w=620&h=284
除非消费发生重大变化，长期低于50刀的可能基本没有。
看过一个内部报告，在50刀的情况下40多家IOC可能只有3，4家可以保持盈利。 晨枫 发表于 2014-12-21 22:29
为什么油砂比页岩先停呢？
加拿大油砂藏深只有十几米，开采时是挖出来用汽车运到处理厂，加上热水搅拌，油、水、砂分离后砂再运回回填。那个大“搅拌机”也因为砂子磨损很大，要经常维修更换部件，这个生产过程决定了它的成本支出主要在日常生产中。
页岩是要先打井压裂，井建好后只要抽油就行了，有的可能要注水，这也要先打井。它的主要投入的先期打井中。生产时基本只要支付抽油和注水的费用就行了，这部分占总成本的比例很低。
用下面具体数字可能不准的例子：如果两者单位总成本都是100的话，油砂前期投入是20日常投入80.页岩是反过来。不管停不停产亏不亏本，这前期投入是固定已经花出去了，遇到问题只要还贷不迫在眉睫这部分可以先放一边不管。这样的话油价降到80以下油砂就还得不停地向里投钱才能生产，页岩降到20还能不投钱维持生产。
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